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COMPLEXITY AND EFFICIENCY AT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURTS
Stuart Ford∗
ABSTRACT
One of the most persistent criticisms of international criminal tribunals has
been that they cost too much and take too long. In response, this Article
presents a new approach that utilizes two concepts: complexity and efficiency.
The first half of this Article proposes a method for measuring the complexity of
criminal trials and then uses that method to measure the complexity of the
trials conducted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The results are striking. Even the least complex ICTY trial
is more complex than the average criminal trial in the United States, and the
most complex ICTY trials are among the most complex trials that have ever
taken place. This highlights why it is misleading to compare the cost and
length of the ICTY’s trials to other trials, both domestic and international,
without first accounting for their complexity.
The second half of the Article explores the efficiency of international
criminal trials. Efficiency is defined as the complexity of a trial divided by its
cost, and the Article calculates the overall efficiency of the ICTY and then
compares that to the efficiency of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
and a sample of criminal trials in the United States. The results show that the
ICTY is more efficient than the SCSL and approximately as efficient as
complex murder trials in the United States. The ICTY is less efficient than a
typical domestic murder trial, but this appears to be because efficiency
decreases as complexity increases, making such cases poor comparators.
Although the data is sparse, the ICTY appears to be much more efficient than
its closest domestic comparator—mass atrocity trials. Ultimately, the ICTY has
been more efficient than cases of comparable gravity and complexity tried in
domestic courts or at the SCSL.
∗ Assistant Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. This Article was
greatly improved by the contributions of those who commented on earlier versions, including Professors Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Daryl Lim, Morse Tan, Anne Holthoefer, Lesley Wexler, Robert Knowles, Jonathan Hafetz,
and David Wippman. Thanks are also due to those who provided feedback at the various conferences where
this was presented. Fang Han, Gregory Cunningham, and Iveliz Orellano provided research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
International criminal courts are established primarily to conduct trials,1
despite being given additional goals.2 Thus the trials at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ought to be one of its
signature accomplishments. Yet, the trials have been one of its most criticized
features. The ICTY will eventually cost more than $2.7 billion3 and take more
than twenty years to finish.4 As a result, many writers have argued that the
ICTY has been too slow, too inefficient and has cost too much.5 For example,
there are seventy-five law review articles that use the word “slow” in the same
sentence as “ICTY.”6 Similarly, eighty-five law review articles use either
1 Shahram Dana, Turning Point for International Justice?, in XI ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 962, 972 (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2007) (“The primary
function of the international criminal tribunal is to determine the criminal responsibility and punishment of
those individuals found guilty of the crimes under its jurisdiction.”); Adrian Fulford, The Reflections of a Trial
Judge, 22 CRIMINAL L.F. 215, 216 (2011) (“We are first, foremost and last a criminal court: our core business
is to process criminal trials. All the rest, and I hasten to add some of the rest is very important indeed (such as
our deterrent potential, reparations to victims and outreach), is secondary to the Court’s obligation to
investigate, arrest and try alleged criminals.”); O-Gon Kwon, The Challenge of An International Criminal
Trial as Seen from the Bench, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 360, 373 (2007) (“The task of
determining guilt or innocence must take precedence over other, not strictly judicial, considerations”); U.N.
Secretary-General, 20, U.N. Doc A/C.5/52/4 (Oct. 21, 1997) (“[Chambers] performs the fundamental core
activity of the Tribunal, that is, the trial and determination of guilt or innocence of persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law within the territory of the former Yugoslavia”).
2 See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). The ICTY was given the additional goals of
putting an end to the commission of crimes in the former Yugoslavia and restoring peace in the Balkans. Id.
See also Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal
Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405,
472 (2012) (noting that the goals of international criminal courts include establishing the historical record and
fostering post-conflict reconciliation).
3 See Stuart Ford, How Leadership in International Criminal Law Is Shifting from the United States to
Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending on and Contributions to International Criminal Courts, 55 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 953, 971 (2011) (estimating the cost as $2.3 billion). The estimate of $2.3 billion was based on
the assumption that the ICTY would shut down in 2014. Id. Now that it is clear the ICTY will continue to
operate into at least 2017, see infra note 4, it will certainly cost more than that. My current estimate is that it
will ultimately cost $2.7 billion. See infra note 178.
4 The ICTY was established in 1993. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808/ (Feb. 22, 1993).
According to its most recent report on its Completion Strategy, the ICTY will not finish its last trials and
appeals until early 2017. See President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Assessment and report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution
1534 (2004) and covering the period from 24 May to 18 November 2013, transmitted by letter to President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2013/678, at 39 (Nov. 18, 2013) (by Judge Theodor Meron).
5 See Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered,
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 324 & n.1 (2009).
6 This data comes from a Westlaw search of the Law Reviews & Journals database using the search
“ICTY /25 slow.” The search was conducted on June 24, 2014. The vast majority of the results are articles that
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“expensive” or “costly” in the same sentence as “ICTY”,7 and sixteen use the
word “inefficient” in the same sentence as “ICTY.”8 Professor Whiting
describes this belief that the ICTY has been too slow and cost too much as the
“consensus” position among academics.9 Some have even argued that the slow
pace of the trials “call[s] into question the efficacy of international criminal
justice.”10
Nor are academics the only ones to criticize the ICTY’s pace and cost.
States and policymakers have also been deeply critical. For example, Ralph
Zacklin, who was the Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs at the
United Nations, described a sense of “dissatisfaction which has become
pervasive among the Member States” that he called “donor fatigue.”11
According to him, most states eventually decided that the cost of the ICTY was
not justified and that the ICTY “exemplif[ied] an approach that is no longer
politically or financially viable.”12 Others have also diagnosed donor fatigue
among states.13
One response to this criticism has been that critics are judging the cost and
length of ICTY trials by comparing them to trials in domestic court systems
and that this comparison is unfair.14 Thus, a supporter of the ICTY might say:
Of course its trials took longer and cost more than the average domestic trial,

either accuse the ICTY of being slow or note that the ICTY has been accused of being slow. Running the same
search in the News database found 80 responsive newspaper articles.
7 This data comes from a Westlaw search of the Law Reviews & Journals database using the search
“ICTY /25 (expensive costly).” The search was conducted on June 24, 2014. The vast majority of the results
are articles that either accuse the ICTY of being expensive or note that it has been accused of being expensive.
Running the same search in the News database found 17 responsive newspaper articles.
8 This data comes from a Westlaw search of the Law Reviews & Journals database using the search
“ICTY /25 inefficient.” The search was conducted on June 24, 2014. The vast majority of the results are
articles that either accuse the ICTY of being inefficient or note that it has been accused of being inefficient.
Running the same search in the News database found 10 responsive newspaper articles.
9 Whiting, supra note 5, at 323–24.
10 Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice
Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 347 (2006).
11 Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 543
(2004).
12 Id. at 545.
13 See Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, Gatekeeping Versus Allocating in Foreign Assistance: Donor
Motivations and Contributions to War Crimes Tribunals, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 285, 287 (2007); Higonnet,
supra note 10, at 434; Elizabeth Nielsen, Hybrid International Criminal Tribunals: Political Interference and
Judicial Independence, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 289, 295 (2010); Jonathan O’Donohue,
Financing the International Criminal Court, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 269, 273–74 (2013); Nancy Kaymar
Stafford, A Model War Crimes Court: Sierra Leone, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 139 (2003).
14 See, e.g., David Wippman, The Cost of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 861, 861–62 (2006).
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they are vastly more complex than the average domestic trial, and we generally
expect that more complex trials will take longer and cost more.15 But, while it
is widely acknowledged that the cases that come before the ICTY are more
complex than the typical criminal case in a domestic jurisdiction,16 and some
articles have cataloged the complexity of individual trials,17 the complexity of
international criminal trials has not been studied quantitatively before. Thus, it
has been impossible to directly compare the complexity of international and
domestic trials.
As a result, studying the complexity of trials at the ICTY has a big payoff.
By measuring and controlling for complexity, we can more fairly compare
domestic and international criminal trials. Moreover, once we measure
complexity, it is only a short step to measuring the efficiency of different
courts. Efficiency can be thought of as the complexity of a court’s trials
divided by their cost. Thus, with a complexity measure and cost data we can
calculate the relative efficiency of different courts. In short, studying
complexity tells us whether the ICTY’s trials have been too slow and
expensive compared to other international courts or to domestic trials, given
their complexity. This study sheds new light on one of the most persistent
criticisms of the ICTY—that it has taken too long and cost too much.
Assessing complexity and efficiency quantitatively could also yield
significant benefits for the International Criminal Court (ICC). Every year, the
members of the Assembly of States Parties must decide on the budget of the
ICC. In recent years, this has become a contentious process, with heated
debates about how much money the ICC really needs.18 One of the arguments
made by those states that wish to rein in ICC spending is that the court is
inefficient and that it could do more with the money it has if it became more
efficient. The court disputes that it is inefficient and maintains that additional
funding is necessary for it to comply with its mandate. Much of the debate
15 See id. at 873 (“In general, however, complex cases take longer to try and generate higher overall
costs.”).
16 See id. (“By contrast, almost all ICTY trials, because of the nature of the prosecution undertaken,
entail lengthy and expensive court proceedings and pretrial investigations.”); Patricia M. Wald, ICTY Judicial
Proceedings—An Appraisal from Within, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 466, 468 (2004).
17 See, e.g., Gillian Higgins, The Impact of the Size, Scope and Scale of the Milošević Trial and the
Development of Rule 73bis before the ICTY, 7 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 239, 246 (2009) (“The procedural and
substantive demands of the [Milošević] trial upon all parties were excessive.”).
18 See generally Stuart Ford, How Much Money Does the ICC Need in The LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENT (Carsten Stahn
ed., forthcoming 2014). See also Jonathan O’Donohue, Financing the International Criminal Court, 13 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 269, 279–81 (2013).
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about the ICC’s funding depends on an assessment of its efficiency, but current
assessments are subjective and potentially unreliable. Thus, developing a
quantitative measure of the complexity and efficiency of the court’s work
could significantly improve the budgeting process at the ICC.
Of course, to assess complexity quantitatively, one needs to be able to
measure it, and this Article proposes a measure of complexity that permits
complexity to be measured and compared across international and domestic
court systems. So, how complex are the ICTY’s trials? As far as I can tell, they
are the most complex set of related criminal cases that has ever been tried by
any court anywhere. They dwarf the complexity of domestic criminal
prosecutions, and not even the prosecution of the senior Nazi leaders by the
International Military Tribunal (IMT) can compare with the most complex
ICTY cases. Collectively, the forty-one full trials completed by the ICTY so
far are more than seventeen times as complex as the entire IMT.
This Article’s most important conclusion is that the ICTY’s trials have
been efficient given their complexity. The ICTY has been more efficient than
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), despite the fact that the SCSL was
specifically designed to be more efficient than the ICTY. It is less efficient
than run of the mill domestic murder trials, but there are good reasons to
believe that ordinary domestic murder trials are not a fair comparator. It has,
however, been roughly as efficient as complex murder trials, like those of O.J.
Simpson and Scott Peterson. Most importantly, the ICTY has been more
efficient than comparable domestic mass atrocity trials, like the trial of
Timothy McVeigh for the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.
The conventional wisdom—that the ICTY costs too much and takes too long—
is simply not accurate. This Article shows that the ICTY has been more
efficient than domestic courts would be, if faced with cases of comparable
complexity and gravity.
I. ABOUT COMPLEXITY
The concept of complexity is central to this Article and requires some
explanation. This Part discusses a number of questions about complexity,
including why to use it, how to define it, and the limitations of a complexitybased approach. These theoretical discussions lay the groundwork for the rest
of the Article.
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A. The Utility of Complexity
It is common to allege that the ICTY is slow, expensive and inefficient.19
But the obvious question is: Slow compared to what? Expensive compared to
what? For critics, the answer appears to be slow and expensive compared to
most domestic criminal trials. And while this is certainly true, a number of
people have noted that comparison is unfair because the kinds of cases that
come before domestic and international courts are very different. Trials at
international criminal tribunals are much more complex than the average
domestic criminal prosecution.
If we can measure and account for the differences in complexity between
the two systems, we can make a much fairer comparison. The right comparison
is not between the average domestic criminal trial and the average ICTY trial,
but between trials of the same complexity in both systems. If the ICTY trial is
still much slower and more expensive than a domestic trial of the same
complexity, then it may be that the ICTY is too slow, too expensive and
inefficient. At the least, it suggests that it would be cheaper and quicker to
prosecute violations of international criminal law in domestic courts. On the
other hand, if the ICTY trial costs less than a domestic trial of the same
complexity, then the numbers suggests that the ICTY is not too slow,
expensive or inefficient. Rather, the ICTY is doing better than a domestic court
would do if it were faced with such a case. In effect, by measuring and
controlling for complexity, we may be able to draw conclusions about the
efficiency of the ICTY, with efficiency measured by the cost of trying a case of
a given complexity.
This is not a perfect comparison because domestic criminal trials and
international criminal trials serve slightly different purposes even though they
engage in similar activities. Retribution is a key purpose of both kinds of trials,
but international criminal trials have many purposes (post-conflict
reconciliation, ending impunity, setting the historical record, ending conflict,
etc.) that have no real analog in most domestic criminal trials. These additional
purposes presumably have value and this suggests that we might be willing to
pay more for international criminal trials, even after adjusting for complexity,
than we would for domestic trials. So, even a complexity-adjusted comparison
of domestic and international trials is not a perfect comparison. It is,
nevertheless, a useful comparison.

19

See supra text accompanying notes 5–13.
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Measuring complexity is not, of course, the solution to all of the difficult
questions in international criminal law. It cannot, for example, tell us whether
the level of complexity in a given trial is necessary or desirable. It is
undisputed that the ICTY’s trials are exceedingly complex. Two trials have
been more complex than the trials of the Nazi leaders at the IMT.20 But is this
level of complexity required? The methodology described in this Article
cannot answer that question. I will, however, return to it later, as it is an
important question.21
Another thing we cannot do with complexity is decide whether we ought to
prosecute violations of international criminal law at all. This is an important
point as not all criticisms of the ICTY have focused on the question of its
efficiency. Some have argued against the creation of international criminal
courts for purely political reasons.22 Others have questioned whether
international criminal courts can achieve their purposes,23 which implicitly
raises doubts about whether funding them is worthwhile, irrespective of the
efficiency with which they carry out trials. Showing that the trials at
international courts are no more expensive or time consuming than domestic
trials given their complexity does not directly respond to these questions.
But the reality is that the international community is deeply committed to
international criminal justice. This can be seen most visibly at the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which currently has 122 members. Membership in the
ICC represents a commitment to a permanent venue for the prosecution of
serious violations of international criminal law, and the majority of states in the
world have undertaken that commitment. In that sense, the question of whether
we ought to prosecute violations is less relevant to most states than the
questions of how long it will take and how much it will cost. Indeed, questions
about the pace and cost of international criminal justice have taken center stage
at the ICC, where recent meetings of the Assembly of States Parties have been

20

See infra notes 159–60.
See infra Conclusion.
22 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, The Politics Behind U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court,
6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 97, 98 (1999) (describing opposition to the creation of the International Criminal
Court in the United States based on a fear that it would investigate or prosecute American citizens).
23 See Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329,
331–40 (2008) (questioning whether international courts can achieve their goals); David Wippman, Atrocities,
Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 475 (1999) (questioning
whether international courts can achieve deterrence). But see Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can
International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001) (arguing that
prosecution of serious violations of international criminal law can have positive effects).
21
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dominated by debates about the ICC’s budget.24 A better understanding of
complexity can help states understand how much funding the ICC needs to
complete its trials and how long those trials can be expected to last. This may
not directly answer the question of whether international criminal justice is
worthwhile, but it is valuable information.
The ideal way to justify spending on international criminal courts would be
to directly measure and assign a value to the outcomes of international criminal
justice and compare that to the cost of international criminal justice. Such an
undertaking would resemble a cost-benefit analysis.25 This analysis would
allow us to directly measure the value of the ICTY rather than just comparing
its cost to criminal trials in domestic systems, which we assume have roughly
equivalent value. Professor Shany recently advocated a similar approach to
measuring the effectiveness of international courts.26 He stressed that courts
should be evaluated by their ability to accomplish their goals,27 and that their
cost-effectiveness should also be measured by considering the resources
expended in pursuit of those goals.28 He uses the language of sociology, but the
result would be quite similar to a cost-benefit analysis.
A cost-benefit analysis of international criminal justice would be
exceedingly difficult, although probably not impossible in the long run. First,
we would have to identify the purposes or goals of international criminal
justice. Luckily, there is extensive literature on this subject.29 The next step,
however, is much harder. We would need to measure whether and how much
courts’ outputs contribute to achieving their purposes. It may be that with
careful thought and data collection it would be possible to measure the real
world impact of international criminal courts, but it would be extremely
difficult and time-consuming.30 Without a way to directly measure a court’s
ability to achieve its goals, there is no way to determine the absolute value of
24

See supra note 18.
See Ford, supra note 3, at 954–55.
26 See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 230 (2012).
27 Id. at 230–31.
28 Id. at 237–38.
29 See Damaska, supra note 23, at 331; Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2004); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in
International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 537–43 (2008).
30 Shany, supra note 26, at 239 (“The goals of public organizations, such as courts, tend to be ambiguous,
and the public goods they generate, such as justice, peace, and legal certainty, are hard to quantify”). See also
id. at 248–49 (“The key to assessing the effectiveness of international courts according to the rational-system
or goal-based approach involves evaluation of judicial outcomes”).
25

FORD GALLEYSPROOFS2

10

12/3/2014 8:55 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

its work. Thus, studying complexity may not be the ideal way to assess the
value of international criminal justice because it provides only a relative
measure of value, but it is the best way that is currently possible.
B. Defining Complexity
Complexity in the law has been addressed extensively by Professors
Tidmarsh,31 Stempel,32 and others.33 Much of the existing literature, however,
has to do with civil trials34 in the United States35 and may not be appropriate
for a study of international criminal trials. Moreover, agreement on a definition
of complexity specific to the law has been elusive.36 Professor Stempel
explicitly declines to provide a definition of the term, choosing to focus instead

31 Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial
Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1684 (1992).
32 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 781 (1998).
33 There are numerous scholarly articles that deal in some manner with the concept of complexity in the
law. Some examples include Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (1987);
Michael Heise, Criminal Case Complexity: An Empirical Perspective, 1. J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331
(2004); Ronit Dinovitzer & Jeffrey S. Leon, When Long Becomes too Long: Legal Culture and Litigators’
Views on Long Trials, 19 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 106 (2001); Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH L. REV. 68 (1982); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial
Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994); Peter H.
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992); Theodore
Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, & Nicole L. Waters, Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal
Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171
(2005); Matthew A Reiber & Jill D Weinberg, The Complexity of Complexity: An Empirical Study of Juror
Competence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929 (2010).
34 Some studies have covered both civil and criminal trials. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33. Very
few have exclusively studied exclusively criminal trials. The exception is Heise, supra note 33. Most of the
literature cited below relates largely or exclusively to civil trials.
35 One of the exceptions to the focus on the United States is the study by Dinovitzer and Leon, which
examined civil trials in Canada. See Dinovitzer & Leon, supra note 33.
36 Burbank, supra note 33, at 1463 (“Not even those charged with responsibility to devise procedures for
complex cases in the federal courts have essayed a definition worth of the name.”); Heise, supra note 33, at
366–67 (noting that there is no accepted definition of complexity and that different groups may define it
differently); Eisenberg et al., supra note 33, at 190 (noting that different people probably view complexity
differently); Dinovitzer & Leon, supra note 33, at 117 (noting that courts have difficulty determining when to
categorize cases as complex); Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 30–31 (noting that there have been many
proposed definitions of complexity but little agreement); Schuck, supra note 33, at 2–3 (noting that “legal
complexity is hard to define” and that different people might conceive of it and define it in different ways);
Stempel, supra note 32, at 785–86; Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 33, at 945 n.41 (noting that there have been
attempts to create an all-encompassing definition of complexity, but that such attempts have not generally been
successful). Professor Tidmarsh’s article highlights the difficulty of trying to reach an agreement on a
definition of complexity through its extensive catalog of definitions that have been previously suggested,
which covers more than 40 pages. See Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at 1692–1734.
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on the factors that cause complexity.37 Professor Tidmarsh, on the other hand,
argues that it is impossible to properly assess whether any given case is
complex without a definition of complexity,38 and criticizes those who have
tried to explain complexity without offering a definition.39
Professor Tidmarsh’s attempt to define complexity is the most
comprehensive, but it is a definition of complex litigation in civil trials in the
United States and it is inextricably connected to assumptions about civil trials
in the U.S.40 As such, it is not directly transferable to the context of the ICTY.
Moreover, Professor Tidmarsh tried to distinguish between “routine” civil
cases that could proceed under normal rules and “complex litigation” that
would need special procedural rules,41 and his definition was tailored to that
purpose. This Article does not treat complexity as a threshold between the
routine and the complex.42 For these reasons, this Article will not adopt
Professor Tidmarsh’s definition.
In contrast to the search for a definition of complexity among legal
academics, participants in empirical studies of complexity are usually asked to
measure it without being offered a definition. For example, in the Heise study,
participants were simply asked to rate the complexity of a trial on a scale that
ranged from “not at all complex” to “very complex.”43 In the Heuer and
Penrod study, judges were asked to rate how complex a particular trial was
compared to the average trial they heard.44 The assumption in the empirical
literature is that people can adequately identify and measure complexity
without a definition even as that literature acknowledges that different people
might define and therefore report complexity differently.45 This suggests that
we could proceed without a definition. It seems useful, however, to have a
working definition of complexity.

37 See Stempel, supra note 32, at 785–86 (noting that “a single definition of complexity is both
unnecessary and perhaps misleading”).
38 See Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at 1690 (“a correct understanding of complex litigation might prevent
well-intentioned reform from paving the path to a procedural hell”).
39 Id. at 1694–98.
40 Id. at 1743–50 (basing his definition of complexity on seven assumptions about the nature of civil
procedure in the United States).
41 Id. at 1689–90.
42 See infra notes 104–108.
43 Heise, supra note 33, at 346.
44 Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 35.
45 Heise, supra note 33, at 344–45, 350; Eisenberg et al., supra note 33, at 190.
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A plain language definition will be used because it will help us to
understand what most people mean when they say that a trial is “complex.”
Complexity is usually defined by dictionaries as “[t]he quality or condition of
being complex.”46 If we look at definitions of “complex,” there are two distinct
ideas that appear in most definitions. One idea is that multiple parts of a whole
are related to one another in such a way that they can interact. Thus one
dictionary defines complex as “consisting of or comprehending various parts
united or connected together.”47 Other dictionaries offer similar definitions.48
A second strand of the definition has to do with the difficulty of analyzing or
understanding something complex. Thus one dictionary defines complex as
being “not easily analysed or disentangled.”49 Other definitions also pick up on
this aspect of the word.50 Combining these two strands, something is complex
when it is composed of many interconnected parts such that their interaction
makes the whole difficult to understand or analyze. Complexity then becomes
the state or condition of having these attributes. Thus, for purposes of this
Article, complexity occurs when multiple parts of a system interconnect and
interact in such a way that the whole system becomes hard to understand or
analyze.
Despite having rejected the definitions of complexity in the existing
academic literature, there is much of value in that literature. For example, most
legal scholars agree that there are different types of commonly occurring
complexity.51 The main types identified in the literature are: (1) legal

46

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 613 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., Oxford University Press
2d ed. 1989). Other dictionaries define it similarly. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Angus
Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds., Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2010) (“the state or quality of being
intricate or complicated”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 377–78
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 4th ed. 2000) (“the quality or condition of being complex”); RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 271 (2d ed. 1999) (“the state or quality of being complex”).
47 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 613.
48 See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 46 (“consisting of many different and
connected parts”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 46
(“consisting of interconnected or interwoven parts”); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY,
supra note 46 (“composed of many interconnected parts; compound; composite”).
49 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 613.
50 See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 271 (“not easy to analyze or understand;
complicated or intricate”); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 46 (“so
complicated or intricate as to be hard to understand or deal with”).
51 See Heise, supra note 33, at 358 (noting that judges in the study were asked to rate evidentiary and
legal complexity separately and that the separate scores were then combined into an overall measure of trial
complexity); Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 35 (noting that judges in the study were asked to rate both
evidentiary complexity and legal complexity); Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at 1702–12 (describing various types
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complexity; (2) factual complexity; and (3) participant complexity. Some
scholars identify other kinds of complexity,52 but the three types listed above
feature in the majority of complexity scholarship and are most applicable to a
discussion of the ICTY.
Legal complexity arises from the law itself. Obviously, to reach a legal
decision, a court must first identify the content of the law and then apply it to
the facts of the case.53 This process is sometimes complex, as the law in a
particular field may be dense (i.e., the field is heavily regulated and there are
many different overlapping legal rules to consider), difficult to ascertain (e.g.,
there are many different sources of the appropriate law, which makes it more
difficult to decide which sources apply), extremely technical (i.e., they require
technical expertise or sophistication to understand and apply), or uncertain
(e.g., the law is standards rather than rules based, depends on multi-factor tests
or balancing tests, is heavily fact dependent, or there are a multitude of
conflicting prior precedents to analyze).54
Factual complexity arises from the facts or information needed to reach a
legal decision. Legal decisions require not just an understanding of the law, but
an understanding of the facts and how the law should be applied to the facts to
reach a legal decision. As a result, complexity can arise from the nature of the
facts necessary to reach a decision.55 This can result in complexity if there is a
need for a large numbers of facts, the facts are very technical, the facts are
difficult to determine, or the facts are simply indeterminate.56 There is some

of complexity, including legal complexity, factual complexity, remedy complexity, and party complexity);
Stempel, supra note 32, at 789–96 (discussing legal and factual complexity).
52 For example, Reiber and Weinberg treat “procedural complexity” as a separate form of complexity,
although it looks most like what this Article calls legal complexity. Reiber and Weinberg, supra note 33, at
947. Tidmarsh identifies “remedy complexity” and “party complexity” as additional forms of complexity in
civil trials. Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at 1707–12. These forms of complexity have less relevance in the context
of criminal proceedings.
53 Cf. id. at 1736 (arguing that legal adjudication requires “reasoned judgment, which is based on the
consideration of the disputants’ circumstances, the relevant evidence, and the nature of the claimed
obligation”).
54 Schuck, supra note 33, at 3–4; Stempel, supra note 32, at 789–92 (noting that legal complexity may
stem from the technical nature of the law, the difficulty in ascertaining the law, or the indeterminacy of the
law).
55 Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 35–36 (noting that both the quantity of the evidence and the
difficulty of the evidence caused perceived trial complexity to increase); Heise, supra note 33, at 352–54
(noting that the difficulty of the evidence increased perceived complexity of the trial).
56 See Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 33, at 950–51 (testing a model in which factual complexity was
represented by the need to reconcile the evidence of multiple witnesses who gave conflicting testimony and
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evidence that this form of complexity is the most important for determining
overall complexity.57
The third kind of complexity is participant complexity. Legal decisions are
made by people, not machines. Thus, the people who participate in the legal
process, including the parties, judges, juries, lawyers, and witnesses, have an
effect on that process, including its complexity.58 The lawyers for the parties
may play a deliberate role that affects the overall complexity of the decisionmaking process. For example, some studies of criminal cases suggest that
skilled prosecutors decrease perceived complexity, while skilled defense
counsel increase perceived complexity.59 But even when individuals are not
deliberately assuming roles that affect complexity, they may still have an effect
on it. For example, an unskilled or overwhelmed participant might make a trial
more complex because of their inability to fulfill their role in the process.60
Indeed, there is some evidence that self-represented accused increase trial
complexity, perhaps because they are unable or unwilling to fulfill their role.61
Another concern is that humans’ inherent cognitive limitations62 may increase
perceived complexity by making legal decision-making more difficult.63
Another insight from the legal literature is that the different forms of
complexity arise from different causes and therefore can change independently
of one another. Legal complexity can make decision-making difficult even in
draw inferences from circumstantial evidence); Stempel, supra note 32, at 794–95; Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at
1766.
57 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 36 tbl.2 (reporting that the quantity of evidence and the
complexity of the evidence had more impact on the reported complexity of the cases than the complexity of the
law). But see Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 33, at 952–54 (suggesting that legal complexity makes juror
decision-making more difficult than factual complexity). Of course, the ICTY does not use juries, so the
Reiber and Weinberg finding may not be applicable at the ICTY.
58 See Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at 1755–80; Dinovitzer & Leon, supra note 33, at 112–14 (noting studies
that have indicated that the local legal culture of judges and lawyers affects the length of time it takes to decide
a case); id. at 138 (noting that the vast majority of lawyers in the study believed that lawyer skill, knowledge
and preparation would affect trial length).
59 See Heise, supra note 33, at 355–56; cf. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 41–42.
60 See Stempel, supra note 32, at 796; Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at 1757–59.
61 See Higgins, supra note 17, at 245, 248, 250; U.N. Secretary-General, Budget for the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, for the biennium 2012–2013, 55, U.N. Doc.
A/66/386 (Sept. 29, 2011).
62 Despite our beliefs otherwise, we are not fundamentally rational decision makers. Our decisionmaking is affected by both motivated reasoning and cognitive biases. See Ford, supra note 2, at 419–39.
63 Schuck, supra note 33, at 25 (noting research in social psychology that shows that people have
difficulty with truly complex decisions and tend to radically simplify their decision-making through the use of
heuristics when confronted with complexity); Stempel, supra note 32, at 795–96.
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situations where the facts are straightforward and vice versa.64 Participant
complexity can move independently of factual or legal complexity depending
on the role, abilities, and motivations of the participants.65 Thus, the different
forms of complexity may not all move in lockstep. At the same time, in
practice, the different forms of complexity will often be correlated.66
Moreover, the most complex cases tend to be those that exhibit high legal,
factual, and participant complexity.67
Finally, a number of writers have noted that one form of complexity can
sometimes cause or exacerbate other forms of complexity. For example, when
both the law and the facts are complex, the total complexity of the resulting
decision may be greater than the complexity of the individual components. In
other words, legal complexity and factual complexity may interact in ways that
generate additional complexity.68 High legal or factual complexity may also
cause participant complexity when it overwhelms the abilities of the
participants to perform their roles.69 As a result, total complexity will
sometimes be greater than the sum of the individual types of complexity,
particularly in cases that exhibit high levels of factual and legal complexity.
C. Are ICTY Trials Complex?
Using the definition of complexity described above,70 it is obvious that
trials at international criminal courts exhibit a high degree of complexity. First,
they are marked by many interconnected parts that together form the whole.
Criminal trials are ultimately formed out of, inter alia, the interaction of the
charges, the substantive law, the procedural rules, the evidence put before the
court, and the personalities, motivations, and skills of the participants,
including the prosecutors, defense lawyers, witnesses, judges, and the accused.
Each of these parts interacts with the other parts to produce the whole that we
call a trial, and there are many moving parts. While this is true at some level of
64 Cf. Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at 1703 (noting that cases with relatively simple facts can generate
“wonderfully difficult legal issues”).
65 See supra notes 59–63.
66 Heise, supra note 33, at 359 tbl.8 (noting that evidentiary and legal complexity were often related and
cannot be assumed to be independent); Reiber & Weinberg, supra note 33, at 947 n.48 (noting that procedural
and factual complexity may overlap with one another).
67 Tidmarsh, supra note 31 at 1702–03 (suggesting that cases are not truly complex unless they involve
both factual and legal complexity).
68 Cf. id. at 1702–03 (suggesting that the most complex cases arise when there is a combination of factual
and legal complexity).
69 Stempel, supra note 32, at 796; Tidmarsh, supra note 31, at 1757–59.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 46–50.
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all criminal trials, trials at international criminal courts tend to have many more
moving parts than trials in most domestic criminal systems. For example, they
include a larger number of charges, more individual crime sites, and a larger
number of alleged victims.71 They also have larger numbers of witnesses and
exhibits.72 The larger number of moving parts suggests a higher level of
complexity than is present in most domestic trials.
Second, the parts interact with each other in ways that have made trials at
international criminal courts extremely difficult to analyze. This is exemplified
by the difficulty that courts have had predicting how long the trials will take
and how much they will cost. For example, the ICTY initially predicted that all
work, including appeals, could be completed by 2008.73 By 2004, the court
was predicting that it would complete all of the first trials during 2008.74 Two
years later, it was predicting that first trials would continue into 2009.75 Fast
forward another two years, and the court was predicting that first trials would
be finished in 2010.76 By 2010, the court was predicting that trials would finish
in 2013.77 In 2013, the ICTY acknowledged that three trials would stretch into
2014 or beyond.78 Now it seems likely that the court will be hearing appeals
until 2017.79
71 See Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 45, 75–77, 84–85, 87 (2013).
72 See infra Table 3.
73 See Rep. of the ICTY, 57th Sess., Sept. 4, 2002, 6, U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (Aug. 14, 2002).
74 See President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Assessments and report of
Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided
to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), transmitted by
letter to President of the Security Council, 3, 47–52, U.N. Doc. S/2004/420 (May 21, 2004) (by Judge Theodor
Meron).
75 See President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Assessment and report of Judge
Fausto Pocar, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security
Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Council resolution 1534 (2004), 30, U.N. Doc. S/2006/898 (Nov. 16,
2006) (by Judge Fausto Pocar).
76 See President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Assessment and report of Judge
Patrick Robinson, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security
Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Council resolution 1534 (2004), 42, U.N. Doc. S/2008/729 (Nov. 24,
2008) (by Judge Patrick Robinson).
77 See President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Assessment and report of Judge
Patrick Robinson, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security
Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), covering the period from 15 May
2010 to 15 November 2010, 4, U.N. Doc. S/2010/588 (Nov. 19, 2010) (by Judge Patrick Robinson).
78 See President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Assessment and report of Judge
Theodor Meron, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security
Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), and covering the period from 16
November 2012 to 23 May 2013, 3, U.N. Doc. S/2013/308 (May 23, 2013).
79 See S.C. Res. 808, supra note 4; Letter from the President of the ICTY, supra note 4.
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The court has even admitted that it cannot make accurate predictions: “[t]he
estimation of the length of trial proceedings is more an art than a science, and
the assessments that are always made prior to the commencement of a trial are
by their very nature approximations.”80 Unsurprisingly, it attributes the
difficulty of predicting the length of the trials to their complexity.81 Thus, trials
at the ICTY exhibit not just a large number of moving parts, but interactions
among these parts that make predicting or analyzing them difficult. In short,
they are complex.
Trials at the ICTY also exhibit a relatively high degree of each form of
complexity. Trials at the ICTY tend to be legally complex.82 For one thing,
international criminal law is a specialized and technical area of the law, and
those who practice it tend to be specialists. This stems in part from the fact that
it has multiple sources, including treaties,83 customary international law,84 and
the judicial decisions of a number of different courts.85 Moreover, these rules
often overlap and the same act can be more than one crime, depending on how
it is analyzed. For example, the distinction between murder as a crime against
humanity and willful killing as a war crime depends on a careful evaluation of
the contextual elements rather than any difference in the act of killing.86
The rules themselves are rarely bright-line rules, and they often incorporate
something akin to a reasonableness standard.87 They are also highly fact

80

See President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Assessment and report of Judge
Patrick Robinson, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security
Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), covering the period from 15 May
2010 to 15 November 2010, 6, U.N. Doc. S/2010/588 (Nov. 15, 2010) (by Judge Patrick Robinson).
81 Id. (“This is the nature of trials, particularly trials of the complexity that are heard at the Tribunal.”).
82 See Kwon, supra note 1, at 364 (concluding that the elements of the crimes and modes of liability are
“far more complex” in international criminal law than in domestic criminal law).
83 ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 9–12
(2d ed. 2010) (discussing the sources of international criminal law).
84 Crimes against humanity are largely rooted in customary international law. See Stuart Ford, Crimes
Against Humanity at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Is a Connection with Armed
Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125, 129–80 (2007) (chronicling the development of crimes
against humanity over time).
85 CRYER ET AL., supra note 83, at 109–80 (describing the various international courts).
86 Id. at 246.
87 See Stuart Ford, Is the Failure to Respond Appropriately to a Natural Disaster a Crime Against
Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect and Individual Responsibility in the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, 38
DENVER J. INT’L POL’Y 227, 242, 245–46 (2010) (discussing the intent requirement in international criminal
law).

FORD GALLEYSPROOFS2

18

12/3/2014 8:55 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

dependent, and circumstantial evidence plays a large role.88 Moreover, the state
of the law is often indeterminate. This is particularly true where the law is
derived from international custom, as there will be no definitive writing that
embodies the rule. Even when the overarching rule is treaty-based and thus
presumably easier to determine, there is still often a large number of
potentially inconsistent precedents to consider.89 In short, international
criminal trials demonstrate significant legal complexity.
International criminal trials also tend to be factually complex, at least
compared to most domestic criminal cases.90 The crimes themselves are often
undertaken by hierarchical groups working together, rather than individuals,
and proof of them usually requires detailed proof of the actions of individuals
other than the accused.91 This increases the factual complexity of all but the
simplest ICTY cases compared to the majority of criminal cases in domestic
jurisdictions, which usually involve individuals acting alone.92 They often also
take place across multiple locations and sometimes cover multiple countries or
long periods of time.93 Some of the facts are also highly technical, particularly
those relating to mass grave exhumations and the conduct of organized
militaries, and require the use of expert witnesses to help the decision maker
understand them. Finally, the facts themselves are often indeterminate.94
There is also evidence of participant complexity at the ICTY. For one
thing, the ICTY has had a large number of multi-accused trials.95 Cases that
include more than one defendant have more participants96 than single accused

88 Robert Petit et al., Exploring Critical Issues in Religious Genocide: Case Studies of Violence in Tibet,
Iraq and Gujarat, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 163, 203–09 (2008) (discussing the use of circumstantial
evidence to prove genocide).
89 Id. at 190–94 (discussing the various inconsistent and contradictory sources relating to the meaning of
the word “destroy” in the crime of genocide).
90 See Wippman, supra note 14, at 875 (“Relative to most national criminal court trials, ICTY trials are
inherently complex.”); Kwon, supra note 1, at 364.
91 See Ford, supra note 71, at 67–68.
92 Id.
93 See id. at 85–87. For example, the trial of Slobodan Milošević covered acts that took place in three
different countries at more than 400 crime sites. Id. at 87. See also Damaska, supra note 23, at 340–41
(describing the complexity of the Milošević case further).
94 See generally NANCY A. COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010) (documenting difficulties in fact-finding in
international trials).
95 See infra Figure 1.
96 The additional participants include not just the extra accused, but the additional lawyers that represent
those accused.
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trials, which are the norm in domestic criminal justice systems.97 It seems
likely that participant complexity increases as the number of participants
increases. In addition, it appears that cases are more complex than they would
otherwise be when accused proceed without legal counsel,98 and several ICTY
cases have included self-represented accused who appeared to go out of their
way to increase the trial’s complexity.99 The high legal and factual complexity
of the cases may also breed additional participant complexity as the
participants reach their cognitive limitations.100
D. Measuring Complexity
There are two approaches one can take to measure the complexity of trials.
The approach taken by most empirical pieces is to measure complexity
subjectively.101 Usually this is done by asking the participants or observers to
rank the complexity of a trial on a scale.102 This makes sense as complexity is a
subjective factor. Unlike physical attributes like mass, circumference, or
height, complexity cannot be directly measured. It exists in the mind of the
individual watching or participating in a trial and occurs when the interactions
among the parts of the system make it hard for the individual to understand the
proceedings.
The subjective method is not available here. So far, the Trial Chambers
have sat for more than 7200 days. This results in more than 20 years’ worth of
trial transcripts. It would be too expensive and time consuming to have a group
of people read the trial transcripts and rate the complexity of the trials. Instead,
this Article depends on the availability of an objective measure that can act as
a proxy103 for complexity and that can be assessed from information that is
publicly available. Moreover, I will try to use factors that are common to a
broad range of legal systems, so that complexity can be measured and
compared across different systems.

97

See infra note 133.
See supra note 61.
99 The most famous of these cases involved Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj. Milošević and
Šešelj both used their trials as a platform to attack the court, obstruct the proceedings, and try to influence
public opinion in Serbia. See Turner, supra note 29, at 573–74.
100 See supra notes 62–63.
101 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 33, at 175; Heise, supra note 33, at 343; Heuer & Penrod, supra note
34, at 34.
102 See supra notes 43–45.
103 A proxy variable is “[a] measurable variable that is used in place of a variable that cannot be
measured.” GRAHAM UPTON & IAN COOK, A DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 315 (2d ed. 2008).
98
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Another consideration is whether to treat complexity as a dichotomous or
continuous variable.104 Much of the literature about complexity in civil cases in
the United States is concerned with whether any given case should be
described as either complex or routine. This distinction matters in U.S. federal
courts because cases that are labeled as complex can be subject to different
rules than routine cases.105 However, it is obvious from Professors Stempel’s
and Tidmarsh’s arguments that complexity is not a binary matter.106 Rather,
complexity is a continuum.107 Some cases will be more complex, some will be
less complex. While all cases at the ICTY are more complex than the average
case in the United States, there is still a great deal of variation between the
most complex and the least complex ICTY trials.108 Therefore, complexity will
be treated as a continuous variable.
With these considerations in mind, this Article measures trial complexity
using a proxy variable that is a composite of: (1) the number of trial days the
case takes to be heard; (2) the number of witnesses that testify; and (3) the
number of exhibits that are entered into the record. There are a number of
reasons for focusing on these three variables to create a proxy for trial
complexity. First, in my personal experience,109 these are the best outward
indicators of the complexity of a trial. Second, experts on international
criminal trials tend to describe trial complexity using these metrics. For
example, attorneys who write about complex ICTY cases tend to describe them
in terms of the number of trial days, witnesses and documents that are
necessary to reach a decision.110 The Registry uses similar factors to determine
the expected complexity of a case.111 Moreover, when international judges

104 A dichotomous variable is a categorical variable with only two categories. Id. at 114. A continuous
variable is one whose set of possible values is a continuous interval of real numbers. Id. at 88.
105 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L) (noting that cases that are identified as “complex” may be subject to
“special procedures”). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed. 2004) (providing guidance to
federal judges facing “complex” cases).
106 See generally Stempel, supra note 32 (assessing criteria used to measure complexity); Tidmarsh, supra
note 31 (developing a more formal and inclusive definition of complexity).
107 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 33; Schuck, supra note 33, at 5.
108 See infra Part II.C.
109 The author spent three years working in the Office of the Co-Prosecutors at the ECCC as an Assistant
Prosecutor. He assisted in investigating and drafting the indictments and served on the trial team in the case of
Kaing Keuk Eav alias Duch. Prior to working at the ECCC, he spent more than five years litigating complex
commercial matters before federal district courts in the United States.
110 See Damaska, supra note 23, at 341; Higgins, supra note 17, at 246 (describing the complexity of the
Milošević trial in terms of hearing days, witnesses, and trial exhibits).
111 See Defence Counsel–Pre-Trial Legal Aid Policy, U.N. INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, 22 (May 1, 2006), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Defence/pretrial_payment_
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describe the cases they have decided, they often provide statistics about the
number of trial days, trial witnesses, and trial exhibits, suggesting that they
view these as indicators of complexity.112 Sometimes the judges even make
this connection explicitly.113
Finally, the use of these variables is supported by the empirical evidence.
For example, Professors Heuer and Penrod found that the length of the trial,
the number of exhibits, and the number of witnesses were all good indicators
of perceived complexity in their study.114 Similarly, Professor Heise’s study
found that trial length115 and number of witnesses116 correlated significantly
with perceptions of trial complexity. Professor Heise did not have data on the
number of exhibits and so could not draw any conclusions about the influence
of exhibits on perceived complexity. In short, these three factors generally
correlate with subjective evaluations of trial complexity. Therefore, they can
act as a proxy for trial complexity.117 Thus, these three variables were chosen
to create a measure of the complexity of ICTY trials (hereafter called a
Complexity Score).
There are potential criticisms of this approach. One is that two of the
variables, the number of witnesses and exhibits, primarily measure factual
2006_en.doc (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (using the number and type of witnesses and documents that are
expected to be used at trial to determine the expected complexity of the case).
112 See e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 4 (Aug. 2, 2001) (“In all, the Trial
Chamber heard more than 110 witnesses over 98 days of trial and viewed in the vicinity of 1,000 exhibits.”).
See also Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, Annex II, 1, 15–16, 19–26 (June 10,
2010); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of
the Statute, 11 (Mar. 14, 2012); Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Judgment
Summary, 8, (April 26, 2012); Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the German
Major War Criminals, Introduction, (Sept. 30, 1946); Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T,
Judgment and Sentence 1 n.1 (Dec. 18, 2008).
113 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin
Čorić and Berislav Pušić, Judgment Summary, May 29, 2013, available at http://icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tjug/en/
130529_summary_en.pdf (“During the trial, which closed on 2 March 2011, the Chamber admitted close to
10,000 exhibits into evidence and heard 145 Prosecution witnesses, six of whom were expert witnesses, as
well as 61 Defence witnesses, seven of whom were expert witnesses. The Judgment is a 2,629-page-long
document divided into six volumes, including four annexes and partially dissenting or separate opinions by
Judge Trechsel and myself, all of which illustrates the complexity of this case.”).
114 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 36 tbl.2.
115 See Heise, supra note 33, at 352–53, 355–56, 359, 361–62.
116 Id. at tbl.7 & tbl.8 (finding that the number of expert witnesses affected attorney and judicial
perceptions of trial complexity).
117 Cf. id. at 362 (noting that “[a]lthough it is possible to conclude that trial length itself may make a trial
more complicated, a more likely explanation is that complicated criminal trials take longer to litigate”); Heuer
& Penrod, supra note 33, at 36 tbl.2 (finding that the quantity of information presented at trial was the best
predictor of subjective measures of trial complexity).
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complexity, and that as a result the Complexity Score does not do a good job
of capturing legal or participant complexity. There are a number of reasons
why I believe this criticism is misplaced. First, the three factors used in the
Complexity Score are the factors that are most often identified as measures of
complexity by those who deal with this issue regularly,118 and there is often
value in a “wisdom of the crowd” approach.119 Anyone who thinks that these
are not the appropriate variables to measure complexity would have to explain
why professionals who deal with these trials think they are appropriate.
Second, our subjective assessment of trial complexity is driven largely by
factual complexity.120 If factual complexity is the largest component of overall
trial complexity, then it makes sense that a measure that tries to duplicate
subjective measures of trial complexity would use variables that are associated
with factual complexity.
Third, it is simply not true that the components of the Complexity Score
only measure factual complexity. For one thing, empirical studies of
complexity have shown that, particularly in complex cases, the various forms
of complexity are often inter-related, and factual complexity cannot be neatly
separated from the other forms of complexity.121 For example, complex legal
questions like whether an individual had the requisite specific intent for
genocide or whether a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population has occurred tend to require large numbers of witnesses and
exhibits to prove. In other words, the number of witnesses and exhibits used in
the ICTY’s trials is driven, in part, by their legal complexity. Thus, measuring
the number of witnesses and exhibits does capture information about the legal
complexity of the case.
The Complexity Score is also clearly affected by participant complexity. In
multi-accused cases, each accused typically calls his or her own witnesses and
offers his or her own exhibits.122 As a result, the number of exhibits, witnesses,

118

See supra notes 109–112.
See Jan Lorenz et al., How Social Influence Can Undermine the Wisdom of the Crowd Effect, 108
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9020, 9020 (2011) (describing the “wisdom of the crowd” effect, where the
“aggregate of many people’s estimates tends to be closer to the true value than all of the separate individual or
even expert guesses.”).
120 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33 (noting studies that show factual complexity is the largest driver of
subjective evaluations of overall complexity).
121 See Heise, supra note 33.
122 See Commc’n Serv. of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Case Information Sheet
for Prlić et al., ICTY, available at http://icty.org/x/cases/prlic/cis/en/cis_prlic_al_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
2013), at 4 (noting the number of witnesses called and exhibits offered by each individual defendant); Case
119
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and trial days in multi-accused trials is a function of participant complexity in
addition to legal and factual complexity. But the Complexity Score also picks
up other aspects of participant complexity. For example, to the extent that selfrepresented accused deliberately try to obstruct the court or draw out the
hearings for political purposes,123 this will show up as additional witnesses,
exhibits, and trial days. In short, there is good reason to believe that the
components of the Complexity Score do capture legal, participant, and factual
complexity.
A different criticism might be that other variables should be added to the
composite Complexity Score. For example, one might expect that increased
factual and legal complexity would result in longer trial judgments as the
judges wrestle with complex facts and difficult legal decisions.124 Indeed, there
is a strong correlation between the Complexity Scores in this Article and the
length of the trial judgments, suggesting that it too has some validity as a proxy
for trial complexity.125 One could probably identify other variables that could
be measured and would correlate with complexity. However, it is not clear that
adding more factors would improve the measure.
Adding additional components has costs. For the Complexity Score to be
useful as a means of comparing across courts it has to be based on components
that can be readily measured across courts. Detailed statistical information
about courts is hard to come by, so a simpler measure is better because it
makes it easier to create Complexity Scores for other institutions. For this
reason, the Complexity Score is composed only of the three components that
the majority of experts usually cite as measures of complexity, even though
one can find other measureable criteria that also correlate with trial
complexity.
Indeed, for some purposes, it might be necessary to have an even simpler
measure of complexity because not all courts report all three components. For
example, it is extremely difficult to find data on all three components of the
Complexity Score for domestic criminal trials. If complexity has to be
measured using a single variable, the number of trial days is the best choice as
Information Sheet for Popović et al., ICTY, available at http://icty.org/x/cases/popovic/cis/en/cis_popovic_al_
en.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2013), at 5 (same).
123 See Turner, supra note 29, at 530.
124 The Judgment Summary in Prlić explicitly claims that the length of the judgment is an indicator of the
complexity of the case. See Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, supra note 113.
125 The correlation coefficient for the Complexity Scores and trial judgment length (measured in pages)
was r = .72. This result was highly significant, with p ≤ .001.
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it is the most commonly reported information, and at least one study has found
it to have the strongest correlation with perceived trial complexity.126
Moreover, measuring trial complexity with just the number of trial days should
produce results quite similar to the Complexity Scores because of the high
degree of correlation among the components of the Complexity Score.127
Nevertheless, this Article will use all three factors to create a Complexity
Score where possible because most observers of international trials agree that
trial complexity is best measured using all three components.
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ICTY’S TRIALS
This Section measures the complexity of the ICTY’s trials. Unless
otherwise indicated, data comes from a database about the ICTY created by the
Author. More information about the database and how it was created can be
found in an earlier work about the ICTY’s indictments.128 For this Article, the
database was updated to include data through June 17, 2013.
A. The Cases
The ICTY indicted 161 accused, and these were divided into 79 cases.
However, 17 cases ended without a trial.129 In 59 cases, first trials have now
been completed. The trials of Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić, and Goran
Hadžić are still underway. These three trials represent the last cases the ICTY
will try before it shuts down. As a result, the ICTY will eventually make a
determination of guilt or innocence in 62 cases, involving 112 accused. This
makes the ICTY the largest international criminal tribunal ever, at least by total
number of accused.130
Summary statistics about the ICTY’s cases are presented below in Table 1.
The median ICTY case involved nine counts against the accused, including
four war crimes charges, five charges of crimes against humanity (CAH), and

126

See Heise, supra note 33.
See infra Table 3.
128 See Ford, supra note 71, Section VII (describing the creation of the database). A copy of the data is
available upon request from the author.
129 Three cases were withdrawn by the prosecutor because the accused were not of sufficient importance,
seven cases were transferred to domestic courts, and seven cases ended with the death of the accused prior to
entry of a judgment.
130 Its closest competitor, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), has tried only 74
accused. See Status of Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.
aspx (last visited June 17, 2013).
127
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zero genocide charges.131 The number of counts, the kinds of counts, and the
use of different modes of liability are consistent with what one would expect
from an international criminal court that was principally interested in
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused through fair trials.132
Table 1: Summary Statistics of All ICTY Cases
Mean Median
S.D.
Total Counts
13.3
9
11.9
War Crimes Counts
7.7
4
8.9
CAH Counts
5.2
5
4.7
Genocide Counts
.4
0
.78
JCE*
.4
.5
Superior Responsibility*
.7
.4
Planning*
.6
.5
Ordering*
.7
.5
Instigating*
.6
.5
Aiding and Abetting*
.7
.5
Direct Perpetration*
.4
.5
* represents a dummy variable

Min.
1
0
0
0
-

Max.
66
49
24
2
-

Forty of the ICTY’s trials were single-accused trials; the remaining 22 were
multi-accused trials, but these multi-accused trials involved 71 accused. Thus
while the majority of the trials have been single accused trials, the majority of
the accused (63%) will be tried in multi-accused trials. Indeed, large multiaccused trials have been a hallmark of the ICTY’s practice. See Figure 1
below.

131 Given that the averages for most of these figures are skewed by a few outliers, the median values are
more representative of the cases that came before the ICTY.
132 See generally Ford, supra note 71 (finding that charging and sentencing practices in the ICTY are
generally comparable to the range of practices considered fair in domestic criminal justice systems).
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Figure 1: Number of Accused Per Trial
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One thing this data shows is that the cases that have come before the ICTY
are not like the cases that come before domestic criminal courts in the United
States. For one thing, there are significantly more multi-accused trials at the
ICTY. In the U.S., most accused are tried alone.133 The number of counts in the
average ICTY case (13.3) is also significantly higher than in the United States.
According to one study, nearly half of all felony defendants in the U.S. are
charged with just a single crime.134
The cases heard by international criminal courts also involve much more
serious allegations of criminality than the vast majority of cases heard by
domestic criminal courts. For example, the average case at the ICTY involves
allegations of the unlawful killing of more than 100 individuals, often in
conjunction with the forced transfer or unlawful imprisonment of thousands of
people.135 By contrast, only 0.6% of felony defendants in U.S. courts are
charged with even a single murder, and only 23% of felony defendants are
charged with any sort of violent offense.136 Only the most serious mass atrocity
trials that take place in domestic systems can compare with the seriousness of
even the average ICTY case.137
133

For example, in federal district courts in the United States, the average number of accused per criminal
case is only 1.3. THOMAS F. HOGAN, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at tbl.D (2012). If one compares the number
of criminal cases opened in 2011 (78,440) with the number of new criminal defendants in that same period
(102,931), one can surmise that there were approximately 1.3 defendants per case. Id. at 192, 195.
134 See THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at App. tbl.1 (2010) (noting that 48% of
felony defendants had no other charges pending against them).
135 See Ford, supra note 71, at 104.
136 See COHEN & KYCKELHAHN supra note 134, at tbl.1.
137 See Ford, supra note 71, at 104.
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B. Computing Complexity Scores
Summary statistics for the number of trial days, trial witnesses, and trial
exhibits needed for the ICTY’s trials are shown below in Table 2. These
figures are based on the 41 cases that have had full trials so far. It excludes
those cases that were dropped prior to trial,138 the 18 trials that were resolved
with guilty pleas,139 and the three trials that are still underway.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Complexity Components
Mean

Median

S.D.

Min.

Max.

Trial Days

176

150

102

10

465

Trial Witnesses

121

104

63

14

315

Trial Exhibits

2,022

1351

2015

37

9,876

To construct a Complexity Score for each trial, the value of each of the
three complexity components in that trial was converted to a ratio of that value
to the highest value of that variable in any case that had a full trial. The three
ratios were then added together to produce a Complexity Score. The scores
have a theoretical range of 0 to 3, but the actual scores range from .07 to
2.63.140 The three components of the Complexity Score are highly correlated,
as indicated below in Table 3.
Table 3: Correlations Between Components of Complexity Score
Trial Days
Trial Witnesses
Trial Exhibits
Trial Days

1

Trial Witnesses
.7877***
Trial Exhibits
.8819***
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

138

1
.6553***

1

See supra note 129.
In cases where the accused pled guilty, either no evidence was presented or only limited evidence was
presented.
140 See infra Appendix.
139

FORD GALLEYSPROOFS2

28

12/3/2014 8:55 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

C. Conclusion
The Complexity Scores allow us to make comparisons between ICTY
cases. A list of the ICTY’s completed trials, ordered from least to most
complex, is attached as an Appendix at the end of this Article. This list shows
that there has been significant variability in complexity across the ICTY’s
trials. Furundžija, the simplest ICTY trial, involved only 14 witnesses and 37
exhibits and lasted only 10 trial days. It had a Complexity Score of 0.07. The
most complex full trial, Prlić et al., involved 199 witnesses, 9876 exhibits, and
took 465 trial days to complete. It had a Complexity Score of 2.63. Thus, the
Prlić et al. case was nearly 40 times more complex than the Furundžija case.
The average ICTY trial took 176 trial days, and involved 121 witnesses and
2022 exhibits. It would produce a Complexity Score of 0.97. By comparison,
the median ICTY trial took 150 days, and involved 104 witnesses, and 1,351
exhibits. It would produce a Complexity Score of only 0.77. The median score
is lower because outliers (like Prlić et al. and Popović et al.) push up the
average values.
Collectively, in these 41 cases, more than 4900 witnesses have testified and
more than 80,000 exhibits have been entered into the record over the course of
more than 7200 trial days. The trial judgments, if added together, cover nearly
18,000 pages, while the appeal judgments cover more than 6000 pages. In
addition to the judgments, there have been more than 15,000 other judicial
decisions, and 22,000 filings by the parties, covering a dizzying array of
topics.141 There are also more than 20,000 official documents of various other
sorts in the ICTY Court Records database.142 Along the way, the prosecution

141 This information was obtained by searching in the ICTY Court Records database located at
www.ICR.ICTY.org. Under “Select Name of Accused,” the option for “All Accused” was chosen. The results
were then narrowed down to only those in English to avoid picking up duplicates of the same document in
multiple languages. Judicial decisions are those documents that appear under the category of “Decisions and
Orders.” Filings by the parties are a combination of the results that appear under the categories of “Briefs,”
“Responses,” and “Motions.” The searches were conducted on July 7, 2013. The searches were then repeated
in French and Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian. The results were substantially lower for both other languages,
suggesting that significant numbers of documents are available only in English.
142 This figure combines the English language documents that were found under the categories of
“Notices,” “Transcripts,” “Witness-Related Materials,” “Correspondence,” “Warrants and Subpoenas,” and
“Other” on the ICTY Court Records Database. More than 10,000 of these documents are transcripts of court
proceedings. The search was conducted on July 7, 2013.
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has cataloged, analyzed and disclosed millions of pages of documents to the
defense teams.143
III. COMPARATIVE COMPLEXITY
This section compares the ICTY to both other international criminal courts
and to domestic criminal courts. While each of the modern international
criminal courts (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ECCC, and ICC) is unique in certain
ways, they are all also quite similar. They have jurisdiction over very similar
substantive crimes, have similar structures, and often have similar procedural
rules. Accordingly, it is quite common to make comparisons between
international tribunals,144 and most writers seem to accept that the courts are
similar enough for such comparisons to be useful.
But, can the ICTY be compared to domestic courts? There are greater
differences between the ICTY and domestic courts than between the ICTY and
other international criminal courts. For example, international criminal law is
substantively different from the vast majority of domestic criminal law;145
trials at international criminal tribunals generally deal with crimes that are
much graver than the average domestic trial;146 the purposes of international
criminal trials differ from those of domestic criminal trials;147 and international
criminal tribunals have their own procedural and evidentiary rules,148 although
these may be quite similar to the rules that govern trials in the United States.149
There are differences, but the differences are not so dramatic that domestic
and international trials are fundamentally different undertakings. Indeed, trials
143 See Higgins, supra note 17, at 246 (noting that the prosecution disclosed more than 1.2 million pages
of documents to the defense just during the trial of Slobodan Milošević).
144 See generally Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda:
Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1997) (comparing the ICTY and
ICTR); Gideon Boas, Comparing the ICTY and the ICC: Some Procedural and Substantive Issues, 47
NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 267 (2000) (comparing the ICTY and ICC); Donna E. Arzt, Views on the
Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra
Leone, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 226 (2006) (comparing the ICTY and SCSL).
145 While there are similarities between domestic and international criminal law, the key international
crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) were created by international law and have no
direct analogs in most domestic legal systems. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 83, at 8–12.
146 See supra notes 135–137 and accompanying text.
147 See supra Part I.A.
148 See, e.g., ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.49, (May 22, 2013), http://
www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev49_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY
Rules].
149 See infra Part IV.A.
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proceed quite similarly before international tribunals and domestic courts in
the United States. The prosecution has to prove the accused’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and this is done by presenting evidence in the form of
witness testimony and exhibits to the trier of fact.150 The accused, in turn, has
the right to examine the evidence presented against him and to present his own
evidence.151 On the whole, domestic criminal trials and international criminal
trials are more similar than different.
This similarity is unsurprising given that fair trial guarantees are a key
component of international human rights law.152 Thus trials in both domestic
and international courts must comply with the same minimum standards. There
is still room for differences across legal systems, but the fundamentals should
be quite similar. Indeed, the fundamentals are similar enough that, once the
trials have been adjusted for their relative complexity, a comparison between
the two systems tells us something useful about international criminal
justice.153
Having said that, the trials at the ICTY look most like trials in common law
countries like the United States, Canada, Britain, or Australia.154 It may be that
the differences between the ICTY’s trials and trials in jurisdictions that do not
use a common law system would stretch the comparison too far. For example,
it is not clear how one should account for the work done during the
investigation phase in countries that use an investigating judge.155 Thus, this
Article will focus primarily on a comparison between the ICTY’s trials and
trials that take place at other international tribunals or in courts in the United
States.
150 ICTY Rules, supra note 148, at R. 87(A). The trier of fact is often different, however. At the ICTY, the
trier of fact is a Trial Chamber, composed of three judges. In many criminal trials in the United States the trier
of fact is a jury. See Kwon, supra note 1, at 363.
151 ICTY Rules, supra note 148, at R. 85. The overwhelming majority of accused at international criminal
courts are male.
152 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
14668.
153 Cf. Shany, supra note 26, at 249 (suggesting that it is appropriate to compare international and national
courts that share “comparable functions”); Wippman, supra note 14, at 862.
154 While the overall ICTY system is a blend of common and civil law features, the common law features
are more prominent, particularly at the trial phase. See Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and
Continental Law at the ICTY and Its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 243 (2004); Kwon,
supra note 1, at 363.
155 The work of the investigative judge may well shorten the resulting trials by establishing much of the
evidence that the parties would otherwise be required to present to the court, but would not show up in the
variables used to compute the Complexity Score. Cf. Fairlie, supra note 154, at 248–51 (comparing the pretrial phases in the common law and civil law systems).
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A. Complexity of Trials at Other International Courts
This Part uses the methodology described above to compute Complexity
Scores for a selection of trials at other international tribunals. For example, the
ICTR’s first case, the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, took place over 60 trial days
and involved the use of 41 witnesses and 155 exhibits.156 This results in a
Complexity Score of only 0.27. Thus, the Akayesu trial would rank somewhere
between the simplest and the second simplest trial the ICTY undertook. The
case against Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch at the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) involved 55 witnesses, approximately 1000
exhibits, and took 77 trial days.157 This results in a Complexity Score of 0.44.
If the Duch trial had taken place at the ICTY, it would have been one of the
simpler cases, falling somewhere between the case against Pavle Strugar and
the case against Milorad Krnojelac. It would have been significantly less
complex than the median ICTY case.
The Lubanga trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) involved 204
trial days, 67 witnesses, and 1373 exhibits.158 This implies a Complexity Score
of 0.79. This is almost exactly the same as the complexity of the median ICTY
trial. In contrast, the trial of Charles Taylor, the former head of state of Liberia,
at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) took 420 trial days and resulted
in the calling of 115 witnesses, and the entry into the record of 1522
exhibits.159 This equates to a Complexity Score of 1.37, which would place the
Taylor trial in the top quarter of ICTY trials in terms of its complexity.
Not even the trial of the Nazi leaders, however, can compare to the most
complicated ICTY trials. The trial of the major German war criminals by the
IMT was a massive undertaking.160 There were 403 “sessions” of the Tribunal.
156 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 24, 28 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://
www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf.
157 Kaing Guek Eav, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (ECCC), http://www.
eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/kaing-guek-eav (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) (identifying the number of trial
days and witnesses); Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch), Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, para 56
(2010), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/20100726_Judgement_
Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf (identifying the number of trial exhibits).
158 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute, 11 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
159 See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Judgment Summary, 8 (Apr. 26,
2011), http://www.worldcourts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/2012.12.17_Prosecutor_v_Taylor.pdf.
160 See International Military Tribunal, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 Nov. 1945–1 Oct. 1946 (1947). The introduction to the
judgment contains a description of the trial, from which the figures necessary for calculating its complexity
have been drawn.
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259 witnesses gave evidence, including 143 who gave evidence in written
form. Finally, approximately 5800 exhibits were entered into the record.161
This indicates a Complexity Score for the IMT trial of 2.27. Yet, had the ICTY
heard the case against the major German war criminals, it would have been
only the third most complex case the ICTY has heard. If the complexity scores
for all the ICTY cases to date are added up, the ICTY’s trials have been more
than 17 times as complex as the case tried at the IMT. And this multiple will
only get higher as the remaining ICTY cases are completed. Figure 2 shows
the relative complexity of trials at a number of international criminal courts.

Figure 2: The Relative Complexity of International Trials
at Different Courts
3

Complexity
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B. Complexity of Domestic Criminal Trials
This Article’s methodology also allows for a comparison of the complexity
of international trials and domestic trials in the United States. According to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, there were 8453 criminal
cases completed in the US federal district courts during the period September

161 While the Judgment of the IMT is somewhat vague about the number of exhibits (it refers only to
“several thousands of exhibits”), other sources give more exact figures. See LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE
MEMORY OF JUDGMENT 12 (2001) (noting that there were approximately 4000 documents and 1800
photographs that were entered into the record as exhibits).
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2010 to September 2011.162 Of these trials, 5779 (68%) lasted one day or less.
Only 37—less than half of one percent—lasted more than 20 days.163 No data
was available on the average number of witnesses or exhibits introduced
during those trials, making it impossible to calculate Complexity Scores for
them. Nevertheless, it is clear that the average federal trial is nowhere near as
complex as the cases that come before the ICTY.
A dataset does exist that contains data on all three components of the
Complexity Score for a sample of domestic criminal prosecutions. It was
compiled by Professors Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod in the early 1990s and
consists of information on 160 random criminal trials conducted at both the
federal and state level in 33 states.164 Among the information they collected
was the number of witnesses who testified, the trial length,165 and the number
of exhibits entered into evidence.166 Complexity Scores were calculated for the
cases in their dataset.
The least complex case in Heuer and Penrod’s dataset has a Complexity
Score of 0.007, making it ten times less complicated than the least complicated
ICTY case. The median trial in their dataset had a Complexity Score of 0.028,
while the average case had a Complexity Score of 0.043. Both of these scores
are lower than the least complex ICTY case. Only the most complicated case
in their dataset had a Complexity Score higher than the least complex ICTY
case, with a score of 0.20. However, this case was still significantly less
complex than even the second least complicated ICTY case, and nearly five
times less complex than the average ICTY trial. Other datasets on domestic
criminal trials yield similar results.167 As can be seen from Figure 3 below, the
162

See HOGAN, supra note 133, at tbl. T-2.
Id.
164 Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at 34–35.
165 They collected the information on trial length in days and hours and then converted them to trial hours
at the rate of four hours per day for criminal trials. Since trial days were used rather than trial hours in this
study, trial hours were converted back to days using the same conversion rate. Id. at tbl. 1 (explanatory note).
This may not be an entirely accurate comparison as the ICTY defaults to five courtroom hours per day and, in
practice, often exceeds this. See U.N. Secretary-General, Budget for the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, for the biennium 2012–2013, 31, U.N. Doc. A/66/386
(Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Budget for the International Tribunal].
166 Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33, at tbl.1.
167 According to one study, the average non-capital murder trial in North Carolina in the early 1990s took
3.8 days. See PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA SLAWSON, THE COST OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH
CAROLINA tbl. 6 (1993). The study did not contain data on the number of exhibits or witnesses, but when
comparing the average length of a murder trial in that study to the average length of an ICTY trial, the ICTY
case takes 45 times longer to present than the murder trial. See also infra Part IV.C.2.e–g.
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average trial in the Heuer and Penrod dataset barely even registers when placed
on the same chart as the ICTY’s cases.168
Figure 3: The Relative Complexity of Domestic and
International Trials
3

Complexity
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0
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Trial Complex
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Trial
Trial
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ICTY
(US)*
Trial

Only the most complex U.S. criminal trials can compare to ICTY cases.
For example, one of the longest and most complex criminal trials in U.S.
history was the 1988 trial of the Lucchese crime family.169 It lasted nearly 21
months and involved 90 witnesses and 850 exhibits; the 20 defendants were
accused of multiple acts of selling and distributing cocaine, credit card fraud,
gambling, and loansharking that took place over a nine year period.170 It rates a
complexity score of 1.09, which makes it slightly more complex than the
average ICTY trial, but there have been 15 cases at the ICTY that were more
complex, including 2 that were more than twice as complex. While it is
axiomatic that international criminal trials are long and complex, this is true in
a way that virtually nobody who has not actually tried one understands.

168 The categories with an asterisk in Figure 3 are based on the data from the Heuer and Penrod dataset.
See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 33.
169 Jesus Rangel, All 20 Acquitted in Jersey Mob Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1988, at A111, 20. The
article describes the Lucchese crime family trial as “[o]ne of the longest criminal trials in the United States.”
Id. See also Paul Richter, Longest Mob Trial Ends in Acquittals, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1988, at 1, 20
(describing the trial as “the longest federal criminal trial in the nation’s history”).
170 See Rangel, supra note 169.
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C. Conclusion
The complexity of the cases that have come before the ICTY is mind
boggling. The ICTY has completed 41 full trials so far, and will complete
another three. The completed cases have a combined Complexity Score of
more than 39, and this will only go up as the remaining trials are completed.
Moreover, there are a number of reasons to believe that this measure
undercounts the real complexity of the ICTY’s work substantially.
For example, the measure does not include the complexity of cases where
the accused died prior to a judgment. That includes the case of Slobodan
Milošević, who died just months before the close of his case. Mr. Milošević’s
trial was arguably the most complex case the ICTY undertook and would have
added significantly to its overall complexity, if it were included.171 At the time
of his death, the judges had heard 295 witnesses, received about 5000 exhibits,
and sat for 466 trial days, and the trial was not over yet.172 This corresponds to
a Complexity Score of 2.44, which is only slightly less complex than Prlić et
al. and Popović et al., the ICTY’s two most complex trials. If the Milošević
trial is included in the calculation, the total complexity of the ICTY’s cases
rises to slightly more than 42.
Nor does it include the complexity of those cases that resulted in guilty
pleas or cases where the accused were transferred back to domestic courts in
the former Yugoslavia for trial. Eighteen cases have been resolved by guilty
pleas, and some of them involved serious allegations against high-ranking
officials.173 In addition, seven cases were transferred back to domestic courts in
the former Yugoslavia after an investigation and issuance of an indictment by
the ICTY. While none of those cases resulted in a full trial at the ICTY and
thus did not contribute to the court’s overall Complexity Score, investigating
the alleged crimes, preparing the indictments, and getting the cases ready for
trial involved significant work.
The calculation also excludes the contempt cases the ICTY has litigated. It
appears that, on average, they have been significantly less complex than the
cases involving allegations of violations of international criminal law, but there
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See Higgins, supra note 17, at 241–49 (describing the complexity of the trial).
Damaska, supra note 16, at 340–41.
173 The most significant guilty pleas came from Biljana Plavšić, who had been the co-President of the
Bosnian Serb Republic (later the Republika Srpska), and Milan Babić, the President of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina.
172
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have been a number of them.174 In addition, 17 investigative dossiers,
involving 43 individuals, were compiled and transferred to national courts.
These dossiers contained the results of investigations by the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) that produced evidence of crimes but for which an ICTY
indictment was never confirmed.175 It took investigative resources to compile
these dossiers, but that expenditure of resources is not captured in the court’s
overall Complexity Score.
As a result of excluding these factors from the calculation, the estimate of
the ICTY’s overall complexity used in this Article is inherently conservative
and there are good reasons to believe that the true complexity of the ICTY’s
work is significantly higher. Even just based on the cases that resulted in full
trials, however, the complexity of the ICTY’s work is enormous. It will
ultimately try the equivalent of more than 17 IMTs. To put it another way, the
41 trials the ICTY has already completed are roughly equivalent to 1400 of the
median cases described in Heuer and Penrod’s dataset.176 As far as I am aware,
the trials completed by the ICTY thus far are the most complex set of related
criminal cases that have ever been tried by any court anywhere.177
IV. EFFICIENCY
It is undeniable that the ICTY’s trials have been enormously complex, but
the ICTY has also been very expensive. The tribunal will cost more than $2.7
billion over its lifetime.178 Once adjusted for inflation, that means the
international community will ultimately pay the equivalent of $3.08 billion in
174 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Assessment and report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6
of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), and covering the period from 15 November 2011 to 22 May 2012,
30–34, U.N. Doc. No. S/2012/354 (May 23, 2012) (by Judge Theodor Meron).
175 Budget for the International Tribunal, supra note 165, at 14.
176 See supra notes 164–168 and accompanying text.
177 While I have not measured the complexity of all the cases at the ICTR, the ICTR has indicted fewer
accused and they appear to have been, in general, less complex indictments and trials. The ICC may eventually
overtake the ICTY in terms of the total complexity of the cases it tries. However, this prospect would require
the equivalent of another 45 trials of the same complexity as the Lubanga trial. I am unaware of any domestic
courts that have tried a comparatively complex set of related criminal cases.
178 This was calculated using the methodology described in Ford, supra note 3, at 989–90. The figure
reported in my earlier article was updated to include data from the 2010, 2011 and 2012 United Nations
General Assembly resolutions authorizing appropriations for the ICTY’s budget. See G.A. Res. 65/253, 3,
U.N. Doc. 65/253 (Dec. 24, 2010); G.A. Res. 66/239, 10, U.N. Doc. A/66/239 (Dec. 24, 2011); G.A. Res.
67/243, 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/243 (Dec. 24, 2012). The calculation was also updated to reflect an estimated
termination of the ICTY’s operations in 2017 rather than 2014. This reflects the fact that the timeline for the
ICTY’s completion has slipped once again. See supra note 4.
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2012 U.S. dollars.179 The question then becomes: did we receive a good return
on our investment?
One way to answer that question is to compare the relative efficiency of
different courts.180 Efficiency is often defined as the ratio of work performed to
energy supplied.181 The principal work performed by international tribunals is
to try those accused of having committed serious violations of international
criminal law.182 The energy supplied to them is the funding that makes those
trials possible. Accordingly, one way to define the efficiency of courts is as the
ratio of trial complexity to cost. Of course, this is not the only way one could
think about the efficiency of international criminal courts,183 but it is a relevant
measure of their efficiency, given that trials are supposed to be their principal
output.
Using this model, the overall efficiency of the ICTY is 1.37 x 10-8 units of
trial complexity per 2012 U.S. dollar. This ratio is based on the total
complexity of the ICTY’s trials184 divided by the inflation adjusted total cost of
the ICTY. Another way to think of this is that each point of trial complexity
cost approximately $73 million to produce. If we can calculate a similar value
for domestic criminal cases or for another international criminal court, we
could compare their relative efficiency and draw some conclusions about
which was more efficient.

179 Past inflation was accounted for using the Consumer Price Index produced by the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Future inflation was assumed to be 2% per year.
180 See Shany, supra note 26, at 237 (suggesting the study of the relative efficiency of international
courts); Wippman, supra note 14, at 862 (noting that one way to determine whether the ICTY provides “value
for money” is to compare the cost of criminal trials in national legal systems with those at the ICTY).
181 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 84 (“[t]he ratio of useful work performed to the
total energy expended”); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 419 (“the ratio
of the work done by a machine to the energy supplied to it”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 46, at 570 (“[t]he ratio of the effective or useful output to the total input in
any system”).
182 See supra note 1.
183 For example, one might also calculate efficiency as the total gravity of the crimes adjudicated divided
by the cost of those trials. This would be a different but also valid way of thinking about efficiency.
184 For this purpose, the complexity of the 41 full trials that have been completed plus the partial trial of
Slobodan Milošević were included. This yields a total complexity of 42.13. That score does not include any
estimation of the complexity of the three trials that are currently underway or any estimation of the complexity
associated with guilty pleas, cases transferred to domestic systems, or the contempt proceedings. See supra
notes 172–175.
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A. Is the ICTY Efficient?
Before we begin comparing the ICTY to other courts, however, we must
address a legitimate concern—that trial complexity at the ICTY is driven not
by complex law and facts, but rather by loose procedural rules and judges that
are unwilling to rein in the excesses of the parties. For example, the measures
used to calculate complexity in the Article could be artificially inflated if the
parties were permitted to introduce large amounts of irrelevant evidence. If this
were the case, the complexity scores of ICTY trials would represent not the
complexity of the underlying cases, but rather the inefficiency of the ICTY’s
procedures and the propensity for the parties to waste time and judicial
resources. This would, if true, undermine attempts to measure the court’s
efficiency. After all, it makes no sense to think of a court’s efficiency as the
complexity of its trials divided by their cost if you conclude that the trials
could be completed in half the time and with fewer witnesses and exhibits but
for time wasting by the parties.
ICTY complexity does not, however, appear to be driven by loose
procedure or lax judges. First, the ICTY uses procedural and evidentiary rules
to limit unnecessary evidence that are quite similar to those used in the United
States. The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admission of evidence before
federal courts,185 and the vast majority of U.S. states follow very similar
rules.186 As a result, the Federal Rules of Evidence can be thought of as the
basic rules that govern the admission of evidence before the majority of courts
in the United States. Therefore, one way to evaluate the ICTY’s procedures is
to compare them to the analogous provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The ICTY may only admit relevant evidence that it deems to have
probative value,187 and the court may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.188
These rules are functionally quite similar to Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the ICTY’s judges are admonished to
“exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to . . . avoid needless consumption of time.”189 This

185

See Fed. R. Evid. 101(a).
See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 2–3 (3d ed. 2013) (noting that 44 states “have adopted the Federal
Rules [of Evidence] in whole or great part . . . .”).
187 ICTY Rules, supra note 148, at R. 89(C).
188 Id. at R. 89(D).
189 Id. at R. 90(F).
186
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language is very similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 611.190 Crossexamination at the ICTY is “limited to the subject matter of the evidence-inchief and matters affecting the credibility of the witness,”191 which is very
similar to Rule 611(b).192 Moreover, ICTY judges have the authority to limit
the time given for the prosecution’s case in chief and “the number of witnesses
the Prosecutor may call.”193 Judges in the United States have similar
authority.194 In short, the ICTY has rules designed to control the trials and
prevent the parties from presenting needless, irrelevant, or cumulative evidence
that are very similar to those used in the United States.
Despite these tools, the ICTY has come under enormous and continuing
pressure to reduce the time and cost of the trials.195 This pressure has forced
the court to adopt some procedures that go considerably farther than simply
overseeing the trial to ensure the parties do not waste time with needless or
duplicative evidence.196 For example, pursuant to Rule 73 bis, judges at the
ICTY may, “in the interest of a fair and expeditious trial, invite the Prosecutor
to reduce the number of counts charged in the indictment.”197 If that does not
work, the Court may simply tell the Prosecutor to limit the number of
counts.198 In addition, the Trial Chamber can fix the number of crime sites or
incidents about which the Prosecution may introduce evidence.199 The aim of
these rules is to expedite pre-trial and trial proceedings.200 Judges do use Rule
73 bis to limit the scope of the prosecution’s case, a fact the Prosecutor has
190 Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). The last three clauses of Rule 403 may serve a similar purpose. See Fed. R. Evid.
403 (giving the court discretion to exclude relevant evidence if it would result in “undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”)
191 ICTY Rules, supra note 148, at R. 90(G) & 90(H).
192 Fed. R. Evid. 611(b).
193 ICTY Rules, supra note 148, at R. 73 bis (C).
194 Who Does What, Witnesses: Qs & As, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Aug. 23, 2013), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&nav=menu5a&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/311
?opendocument (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (“[T]he judge often sets limits on the number of witnesses and the
amount of time for testimony in a particular case. . . . The goal in setting limits is to ensure that each party has
sufficient time to make his or her case, but without redundancy.”).
195 See Kwon, supra note 1, at 361 (“[T]he judges of the Tribunal have found themselves faced with the
daunting task of determining how to change the existing procedures to be able to dispose of increasingly
complex cases in a shorter period of time, while still respecting to the highest degree the rights of the accused
to a fair trial.”).
196 See Maximo Langer & Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial Judging Goes International, but Its Promise
Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY Reforms, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 241, 245–51 (2011)
(describing changes made to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
197 ICTY Rules, supra note 148, at R. 73 bis (D).
198 See id. at R. 73 bis (E).
199 Id. at R. 73 bis (D).
200 See Higgins, supra note 17, at 240.
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vehemently protested as an intrusion on her authority to decide which crimes
and acts to charge.201 In at least one case, the Prosecutor argued that the court’s
use of Rule 73 bis denied the Prosecution a fair trial by forcing her to present a
case that was not “reasonably representative” of the accused’s criminality.202
The ICTY has also adopted a system, contained in Rules 92 bis and 92 ter,
where written witness statements can be admitted in lieu of live testimony.
These rules provide for the use of witness statements rather than live testimony
when the evidence goes to “proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of
the accused as charged in the indictment,” and when “other witnesses will give
or have given oral testimony of similar facts.”203 This rule was adopted to
reduce the length of the trials, but it has been the subject of considerable
criticism. Patricia Wald, who was Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit before becoming a judge at the
ICTY, considered this practice to be the “most troublesome” aspect of the
ICTY’s proceedings.204 “To permit critical material to be admitted without the
ability to directly view and question the witness goes to the heart of the process
and threatens to squander the ICTY’s most precious asset—its reputation for
fairness and truth seeking.”205 Defense counsel at the ICTY share Judge
Wald’s concern that the reliance on witness statements over live witnesses and
cross-examination sacrifices fairness for expediency.206 Not everyone agrees
with these criticisms, of course.207
Over time, the ICTY has adopted rules that permit judges to limit the size
and scope of the prosecution’s case and permit the use of witness statements
instead of live witnesses in certain circumstances. These rules were designed to
reduce the length and cost of the trials, but they are in tension with the court’s
duty to ensure that its trials are both “fair and expeditious.”208 Indeed, at

201

See id. at 251–57.
Id. at 254. But see Kwon, supra note 1, at 372–75 (arguing that Rule 73 bis gives the Trial Chamber
much needed authority to “compel the prosecution to focus the evidence presented on the most important
counts and charges in the indictment”).
203 ICTY Rules, supra note 148, at R. 92 bis.
204 Wald, supra note 16, at 473.
205 Id.
206 See Turner, supra note 29, at 558–60.
207 See Kwon, supra note 1, at 365 (arguing that the procedures on the use of witness statements
“enhanced” the ability of the judges to manage the trials while simultaneously being “fully consistent with
principles of justice and fair trial rights”).
208 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslovia since 1991, Updated
202
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different times and on different issues, prosecutors, judges and defense counsel
have all argued that in changing the rules in ways that promote expediency the
ICTY has risked making the trials less fair.209 Academics have also argued
that, after years of pressure to speed up the trials, the ICTY now places too
much emphasis on expediency at the expense of fairness.210
In short, the ICTY has been under immense pressure to reduce its trial
times. It has tried to achieve that goal by making various changes to the rules
that favor expediency over other goals, including fairness. These far-reaching
changes, however, have not reduced the length of the trials,211 and it may not
be possible to favor expediency much further and still have fair trials. Yet, the
trials remain immensely complicated. The most reasonable way to interpret
this evidence is that there is not a lot of time-wasting going on, and that there is
little additional complexity that can be wrung out of the trials through
procedural changes without profoundly undermining their fairness. In effect,
dividing the total complexity of the ICTY’s trials by their cost does tell us
something meaningful about their efficiency.

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugolslavia, Art. 20(1), (Sept. 2009), available at
www.icty.org/sections/legallibrary/statuteofthetribunal.
209 See supra notes 202 & 205. There is significant disagreement about this, however. See generally
Kwon, supra note 1 (rejecting arguments that there are due process concerns arising out of the changes made
to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
210 See Heidi L. Hansberry, Too Much of a Good Thing in Lubanga and Haradinaj: The Danger of
Expediency in International Criminal Trials, 9 ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION YEAR-IN-REVIEW 357, 357
(2011) (arguing that “judges tend to consider any reason for delay as unjustified and to be avoided at all costs
in order to promote trial expediency” and that this has undermined the protection of witnesses at the ICTY and
ICC); Michele Caianiello, Law of Evidence at the International Criminal Court: Blending Accusatorial and
Inquisitorial Models, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 287, 316–17 (2011) (expressing concern that the
evidentiary rules at the ICTY were amended solely for purposes of expediency and not because of any legal
deficiency in the previous rules); Charles Chernor Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword Mean Dying by the
Sword?, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 707, 751–52 (2013) (arguing that over its lifetime the ICTY’s decision-making
with respect to assignment of defense counsel shifted from an emphasis on the rights of defendants to an
emphasis on expediency); Anna Petrig & Fausto Pocar, Case Referral to National Jurisdictions: A Key
Component of the ICTY Completion Strategy, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 1, 12 (2009) (worrying that referral
decisions were driven largely by concerns of expediency in ways that undermined the legitimacy of those
decisions); Daniel Tillay, The Non-Rules of Evidence in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 45 INT’L LAWYER 695, 715–16
(2011) (worrying that rules about the presentation of evidence were changed largely for reasons of expediency
without due regard for their effect on fairness).
211 See Langer & Doherty, supra note 196 (concluding that the procedural changes made at the ICTY
failed to meaningfully effect the length of the trials).
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B. Comparison to the SCSL
Comparing the efficiency of the ICTY to the efficiency of other
international criminal courts is possible because international criminal courts
tend to be structured similarly, have similar purposes, and conduct similar
trials.212 In addition, the total cost of an international criminal court is pretty
close to the total cost of the justice they produce because their budgets cover
the investigation phase, pre-trial phase (including costs of pre-trial detention),
trial phase (including costs of prosecution and defense), and appeals.213 The
only thing missing from their budgets is the cost of enforcing their
sentences.214 Thus, comparing the overall efficiency of one international
criminal court to the overall efficiency of another international criminal court
comes quite close to an apples-to-apples comparison.
This Article focuses on the SCSL as a comparator because the SCSL has
had a small number of trials that have all been completed. Thus, most of the
data necessary to calculate its efficiency is available and relatively easy to
collect. Complexity Scores for the SCSL’s four trials are presented below in
Table 4. The SCSL’s trials have had a total complexity of 4.27. Not
surprisingly, the trial of Charles Taylor was the most complex trial, although
the RUF trial was not far behind. Both of these trials were more complex than
the average ICTY trial. The CDF and AFRC trials were roughly on par with
the median ICTY trial. Unlike the ICTY, the SCSL did not have any relatively
simple trials, probably because the SCSL focused on prosecuting leaders who
bore the greatest responsibility for the conflict.215

212

See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See generally Wippman, supra note 14.
214 All of the international criminal courts rely on states to enforce the sentences in their own criminal
justice systems. See, e.g., Member States Cooperation, U.N. INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/MemberStatesCooperation (indicating that 16 countries
have entered into agreements for the enforcement of ICTY sentences).
215 See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1(1), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145, available
at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf (limiting the personal jurisdiction of the SCSL to those
“who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law” including “those
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment and implementation of the peace
process in Sierra Leone”). In contrast, the ICTY initially charged a fairly large number of low-ranking
perpetrators. See Ford, supra note 71, at 71–72.
213
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Table 4: Complexity of SCSL Trials
Trial Trial
Days Witnesses
216
CDF Trial
162
119
RUF Trial217
308
171
AFRC Trial218
176
147
Taylor Trial219
420
115

Trial
Exhibits
147
395
119
1522
Total

43

Complexity
Score
0.74
1.25
0.86
1.42
4.27

The total cost of the SCSL over its lifetime is estimated to be $314
million.220 Once adjusted for inflation, that works out to $352 million in 2012
U.S. dollars.221 This gives the SCSL an overall efficiency of 1.21 x 10-8 units
of complexity per 2012 U.S. dollar, which means that it cost about $82.5
million to produce each point of trial complexity at the SCSL. In contrast, it
costs only $73 million to produce each point of complexity at the ICTY,
indicating that the SCSL has been 12% less efficient than the ICTY so far.
Moreover, the ICTY’s efficiency is likely to increase over time.
All of the SCSL’s trials have been completed and are included in its overall
efficiency rating, which is based on an estimate of its total lifetime cost. The
ICTY’s efficiency rating is also based on an estimate of its total lifetime cost,
but it excludes the complexity of the three trials that have not yet been
216 See Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on the
Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Annex F at 21, (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone, Trial
Chambers I, Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://www.refworl.org/docid/484417252.html. The CDF trial
judgment does not contain a direct statement of the number of exhibits entered into the record during the trial.
However, a review of the evidence used to support the judgment indicates that the case was heavily skewed
towards witness testimony. Exhibits are rarely mentioned. The highest numbered exhibit mentioned in the
judgment is Exhibit 147. See id. 98.
217 See Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment Summary, Annex B at
32–36 (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ae9b31c2.html.
218 See Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Sentencing Judgment, Annex A
at 58–63, (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone, Trial Chambers II, June 20, 2007), available at http://www.refworld.
org/docid/467fba742.
219 See supra note 159.
220 This cost was calculated by updating the methodology from Ford, supra note 3, at 993–95. It now
appears that the SCSL will complete its operations at the end of 2013 with the issuance of the Appeal
Judgment in the case against Charles Taylor. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Outreach and
Public Affairs Office, Oral Hearings Conclude in Taylor Appeal, Judges Will Now Retire to Deliberate and
Consider Judgment, (Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=pTTabQ5Bm
2U%3d&tabid=53.
221 Past inflation was accounted for using the Consumer Price Index produced by the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Future inflation was assumed to be 2% per year.
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completed. In other words, the SCSL’s efficiency rating is not likely to change
between now and when the SCSL is formally shut down. The ICTY’s
efficiency rating is likely to increase as the last three trials are completed.
Ultimately, the ICTY will probably be more efficient than the current figures
suggest.
In addition, the SCSL’s efficiency rating is a rating for all of the court’s
work. In contrast, the ICTY’s efficiency rating excludes a significant part of
the court’s work. For example, it does not include the significant resources
expended in investigating and preparing for trial those cases that ended in a
guilty plea. Nor does it include the trial complexity of the contempt cases or
the investigative complexity of those cases and dossiers that were transferred
to domestic courts in the former Yugoslavia. If there were a way to measure
and account for this work, the ICTY’s efficiency rating would be even better.
The SCSL has been much cheaper than the ICTY, but that is because the
Special Court has tried far fewer cases, not because it has been more efficient
at trying cases. Ultimately, the SCSL has not lived up to the hopes of some of
those who championed hybrid tribunals as an efficient alternative to the ad hoc
tribunals.222 Of course, efficiency was not the only supposed benefit of hybrid
tribunals like the SCSL,223 but it was certainly one of their key selling
points.224

222 See Higonnet, supra note 10, at 348 (arguing that hybrid courts would be a “cost-efficient, high
impact” alternative to the ICTY and ICTR); id. at 385–86 (arguing that the SCSL was “more efficient” than
the ICTY); Mathias Holvoet & Paul de Hert, International Criminal Law as Global Law: An Assessment of the
Hybrid Tribunals, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 228, 232 (2012) (describing the SCSL as “effective” and “relatively
cheap”); David M. Crane, Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s Warlords: Building Initial
Prosecution Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third World Armed Conflicts, 37 CASE. W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 1, 2 (2005) (arguing that the SCSL was “efficiently and effectively” delivering international criminal
justice); Kelli Mundell, Capturing Women’s Experiences of Conflict: Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone, 15
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 85, 94 (2007) (noting that the SCSL was supposed to be more cost effective and efficient
than the ICTY); see generally J. Peter Pham, A Viable Model for International Criminal Justice: The Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 19 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 37, 89–90 (2006).
223 See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 306–08 (2003)
(noting that hybrid tribunals may also enhance perceived legitimacy, perceived independence of the judiciary,
accountability, and the creation of regional human rights norms, among other things).
224 See Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L.
395, 446–51 (2011); id. at 446 (“The SCSL was specifically designed to improve on the trial efficiency of the
ICTR and ICTY.”).
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C. Comparison to Domestic Criminal Trials
Two issues make comparing the ICTY to domestic criminal justice systems
more difficult than comparing the ICTY to the SCSL. First, very little
systematic information is available on the cost and length of domestic criminal
trials, either in the United States or elsewhere.225 There are numerous
newspaper reports, policy papers, and scholarly articles that contain
information on the cost of individual parts of particular complex cases,
particularly in the context of the death penalty,226 but the information in these
sources is often incomplete. There have been few systematic studies of the cost
and length of trials, and those that do exist tend to have small sample sizes. As
a result, the information that is available is far from comprehensive.
The second problem stems from the fact that what cost data on domestic
systems is available is usually not data on the total cost of the process from
start to finish. Whereas the budgets of the international criminal courts contain
data on all costs of a case except for enforcement of the sentences, data on
domestic systems is often related to just one part of the total cost of the cases.
The information most commonly reported relates to investigation costs,
225 See Wippman, supra note 14, at 863 (stating that neither federal nor state agencies routinely calculate
the per trial cost and length of criminal trials).
226 See COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 167, at 54 (reporting figures for the cost of murder trials in North
Carolina in 1991 and 1992); The Cost of Justice, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998, at 2 (containing cost figures for a
number of famous trials in the Los Angeles area); Russell Gold, Counties Struggle with High Cost of
Prosecuting Death-Penalty Cases WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2002, at B1 (describing cost of death-penalty cases);
ELI BRAUN, OHIO JUST. & POL’Y CTR., $42,000 FOR A COURTHOUSE HOUR: THE COST OF PROCESSING ADULT
CRIMINAL CASES IN HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO, (2010), available at http://www.ohiojpc.org/text/publications/
court%20cost.pdf; NATASHA MINSKER, ACLU OF N. CAL., THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF
SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA (Claire Cooper & Elise Barducci eds., 2008), available at https://www.
deathpenalty.org/downloads/The_Hidden_Death_Tax.pdf; JOHN ROMAN, ET AL., URB. INST. JUST. POL’Y
CENTER, THE COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND, (2008), available at: http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/411625_md_death_penalty.pdf; JOHN G. MORGAN, COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY (TENN),
TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES (2004); Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell,
Executing the Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End The California Legislature’s Multi-Billion
Dollar Death Penalty Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S72–75 (2011); Terance D. Miethe, Estimates of
Time Spent in Capital and Non-Capital Murder Cases: A Statistical Analysis of Survey Data from Clark
County Defense Attorneys (Feb. 21, 2012) available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
ClarkNVCostReport.pdf; STATE OF KANSAS, LEGISLATIVE DIVISION OF POST AUDIT, COSTS INCURRED FOR
DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2003), available at http://
www.kslpa.org/docs/reports/04pa03a.pdf; Aliza B. Kaplan, Oregon’s Death Penalty: The Practical Reality, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 32–49 (2013); JON B. GOULD & LISA GREENMAN, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
DEFENDER SERVICES—JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES—UPDATE ON THE COST AND QUALITY
OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/FDPC2010.pdf; Margot Garey, The Cost of Taking a Life:
Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221 (1985).
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prosecution costs, defense costs and direct trial costs, but even then, it is
relatively rare to find data on all four of these components for the same trial.
Moreover, the ICTY has paid for a number of services for which most
domestic criminal courts do not pay. For example, a substantial portion of the
ICTY’s budget was spent on translation and interpretation services.227 While
domestic courts do sometimes need such services, it is extremely unlikely that
they make up as large a component of costs in domestic systems as they did at
the ICTY. Similarly, the ICTY has spent a lot of money bringing witnesses
from the former Yugoslavia to testify in The Hague and on housing them
during their stay in the Netherlands.228 It has also in some cases paid to have
witnesses and their families relocated to different countries.229 Most domestic
courts do not have to pay such high costs to obtain the testimony of witnesses.
In addition, the ICTY has funded legacy costs, startup costs, and the costs of
mentoring domestic criminal justice systems in the former Yugoslavia out of
its budget.230 None of these costs have any obvious analog in most domestic
court systems.
In effect, to achieve a fair comparison between the ICTY and domestic
systems, any figures would have to include the same components for both
systems (i.e., either both the domestic and the ICTY figures include costs of
investigations or neither does, etc.). This means that we need to be able to
calculate the cost of the various components of the ICTY’s trials.
1. Breaking Down the ICTY Budget by Functions
The ICTY’s budgets do not directly list the amount or percentage of the
budget spent on particular functions.231 Rather, the budgets indicate how much
has been spent on different organs within the court (e.g., the Registry or the
Office of the Prosecutor) and on different activities (e.g., travel costs of
witnesses, rent on premises, and cost of expert witnesses).232 To solve this
227

See Translation and Interpretation, About the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/165 (last visited Sept. 23,

2014).
228 See VICTIMS AND WITNESSES SECTION, INFORMATION BOOKLET FOR ICTY WITNESSES (2007) at 14,
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Registry/Witnesses/witnesses_booklet_en.pdf.
229 Id. at 22.
230 Richard Dickner & Elise Keppler, Beyond the Hague: The Challenges of International Justice, in
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/01/26/beyondhague-challenges-international-justice & http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/10.pdf.)
231 The Cost of Justice, About the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/325 (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
232
U.N. Secretary-General, Second Performance Report on the Budget of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia for the Biennium 2012–2013, 2–3 tbls. 1 & 2, U.N. Doc. A/68/582 (Nov. 11, 2013).

FORD GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/3/2014 8:55 AM

COMPLEXITY AND EFFICIENCY

47

problem, the Author reviewed the ICTY’s budget documents. For each year’s
budget, each item in the budget was assigned to a particular function. Funding
for the various organs was apportioned according to the number of personnel
in that organ working on different functions.233 In that fashion, it was possible
to approximate the cost of each of the ICTY’s functions over time.234 The
result appears below as Table 5.
Table 5: Cost of Various ICTY Functions
Cost in 2012 dollars

Percentage

OTP Investigations
OTP Prosecutions
OTP Appeals
OTP Other
Direct Trial Costs
Direct Appeal Costs
Witness & Victim Costs
Interpretation & Translation
Legal Aid – Trials
Legal Aid – Appeals
Detention
Security
Registry Support Functions
Startup Costs
Legacy
Excluded

11.37%
6.62%
4.75%
2.64%
11.68%
4.11%
3.25%
11.03%
8.24%
2.68%
4.66%
6.89%
20.01%
1.38%
0.51%
0.18%

$ 350,268,000
$203,761,000
$146,206,000
$81,186,000
$359,698,000
$126,589,000
$100,205,000
$339,603,000
$253,883,000
$82,419,000
$143,613,000
$212,305,000
$616,355,000
$42,501,000
$15,597,000
$5,537,000

The largest component of the ICTY’s cost is for functions that support the
judicial activities of the court. These are labeled “Registry Support Functions”
233 For example, the cost of the OTP was apportioned to investigation, prosecutions, appeals, and other
tasks, depending on the number of personnel assigned to the Prosecution Division, Investigation Division,
Appeals Division, or Immediate Office of the Prosecutor. The cost of the Registry was similarly apportioned
between support tasks and tasks directly associated with trials and appeals depending on the number of
personnel assigned to the various divisions within the Registry.
234 This process was relatively easy for the ICTY budgets covering the years 1994 to 2005, as the publicly
available budget documents for those years were very thorough. It was more difficult for the years 2006 to
2013 as the ICTY’s budgets have become less detailed over time. Nevertheless, it was possible to calculate the
cost of the various functions of the ICTY with reasonable certainty, even for the latter years. Estimates for the
years 2014–2017 are the result of educated guesses about the ways in which ICTY spending will change as the
trials are completed and the focus shifts to appeals. The data that form the basis for Table 5 are available from
the Author upon request.
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in the Table. This category covers any non-judicial cost that is not covered by
any other category. It includes the cost of support personnel within the
Registry (e.g., personnel working on procurement, travel, human resources,
finance, building maintenance, information technology, etc.). It also covers the
cost of operating the court buildings, including the rent on the premises, as
well as utilities, equipment, furniture and supplies. Startup costs, including
construction work necessary to convert the main building into a court,
equipment purchased to get the court off the ground, and some personnel costs
in the court’s first year of existence, were calculated separately.
The security category includes the cost of the guards that ensure the safety
of the court buildings, the staff, and the public. It does not include the cost of
the detention center, which is calculated separately. The ICTY operates its own
detention facility to house accused that are in pre-trial detention. The detention
category includes the cost of rent and guards for the detention center, as well as
medical care for the detainees.
In its early years, the ICTY Prosecutor also acted as the Prosecutor for the
ICTR. As a result, some personnel within the ICTY’s OTP were working on
ICTR cases. This cost has been separated and labeled “Excluded” in the table
above. In its later years, the court also dedicated some resources to preparing
its records and archives for the closure of the court, so that the information
would not be lost when the court ceased to function. That cost has been labeled
“Legacy.” All told, these functions, which are not directly related to judicial
activities, account for about 34% of the court’s total budget over the years
1993-2017.
The remaining 66% of the court’s budget was spent on things that were
directly related to the judicial process. The largest component of this is direct
trial costs. This category includes the cost of the judges and their clerks, plus
the cost of the personnel that staff the courtroom when it is in session (ushers,
court reporters, etc.). This category also includes the majority of the judicial
costs of pre-trial practice.235 The direct appeals category includes the cost of
the judges of the Appeals Chamber plus their clerks.236

235 There was no way to extract the pre-trial costs from the trial costs based on the information in the
ICTY’s budgets.
236 Costs were apportioned between direct trial costs and direct appeal costs by taking total judicial costs
(essentially the sum of the cost of the Chambers, the Judicial Support Division of the Registry plus any items
related to judicial costs) and then prorating those costs based upon the number of judges who were assigned to
trials versus appeals in any given year.
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The witnesses and victims category includes the cost of arranging for the
witnesses to appear before the tribunal. The court is located in The Hague, but
most of the witnesses live in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the ICTY bore
considerable costs associated with bringing the witnesses before the court.237
The largest portion of this cost was travel costs, although it also included
compensation for lost wages, medical costs, the cost of relocating some
witnesses and their families, and the cost of the Victim and Witness Support
Section within the Registry.
Interpretation and translation was a mammoth task at the ICTY.238 The
court worked in two official languages, English and French.239 In addition, the
majority of the witnesses and most of the documents were in a mix of
languages spoken in the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnian, Serbian, Croat
and Albanian.240 The result was that interpreters and translators were crucial at
all stages of the court’s work from the investigation stage, when translators
produced English translations of documents for the investigators, to the
courtroom, where interpreters provided English and French language
interpretation of the testimony of the witnesses. Those costs are collected
together in the interpretation and translation category.
The various costs of the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) were put in one
of four categories. The largest of these categories is the cost of investigations.
This category includes the cost of the personnel involved in the investigations,
their travel costs and various special costs associated with the investigations,
like the cost of exhumations of mass graves. The OTP prosecutions cost
includes pre-trial costs and the cost of the trials. It is largely the sum of the
costs of the personnel in the Prosecution Division of the OTP plus
miscellaneous costs associated with the trials, including travel costs, expert
witness costs, and costs for temporary assistance provided during peak trial
times. The OTP appeals cost represents the cost of those personnel assigned to
the Appeals Division of the OTP. The “other” category includes a number of
OTP functions that were not directly related to the investigations and trials,
including personnel assigned to manage the OTP, train and mentor personnel
in domestic criminal systems in the former Yugoslavia, and provide political
analysis of events in the former Yugoslavia.

237
238
239
240

See Wippman, supra note 14, at 877–78.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id.
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The last two categories relate to legal aid. They capture the cost of
providing defense to indigent and partially indigent accused throughout the
lifecycle of the court. In theory, accused are expected to pay for their own
defense. In practice, the vast majority of accused have depended on legal aid,
and a defense team costs approximately $360,000 per year per accused.241
Legal aid includes payments to the defense counsel as well as the cost of
Office of Legal Aid within the Registry. The costs were divided between those
associated with pre-trial and trial functions, and those associated with
appeals.242
2. Domestic Criminal Trials
With this information, it is now possible to make comparisons between the
cost of the ICTY and the cost of criminal trials in the United States. Given the
scarcity of data, comparisons will be made to both the small number of
systematic studies that exist as well as a number of individual cases for which
cost data is available. The latter category tends to feature high-profile cases
because these are the type of cases for which there is sufficient public interest
for journalists to investigate and report on trial costs.
a. Prosecuting Timothy McVeigh
On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh and his accomplice, Terry Lynn
Nichols, set off a bomb outside the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, that killed 168 people and injured numerous more.243 The cost of
investigating and prosecuting Timothy McVeigh for the Oklahoma City
bombing was $82.5 million between 1995 and 1998.244 After adjusting for
inflation, the investigation and prosecution cost $124.3 million in 2012 U.S.
dollars.245 Defense costs for McVeigh were more than $15 million.246 This
241 See U.N. Secretary-General, Comprehensive Report on the Progress made by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Reforming its Legal Aid System, 31, U.N. Doc. A/58/288
(Aug. 12, 2003).
242 Id. 31, Annex I. As with direct trial and appeal costs, the total amount of legal aid was apportioned
between trials and appeals based on the number of judges assigned to each of those functions in any given
year.
243 See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998).
244 See Wippman, supra note 14, at 862; Howard Pankratz, Bomb Trials Costs $82.5 Million,
denverpost.com, Nov. 3, 1998, available at http://extras.denverpost.com/bomb/bomb1103.htm [hereinafter
Bomb Trials].
245 See Bomb Trials, supra note 244 (noting that the FBI had 2,592 agents investigating the case in 1995
and that this number decreased rapidly over time). The 2012 cost was assumed to accrue in 1995 because it is
clear that the vast majority of resources were expended during that year. (Author’s Calculation).
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translates into $21.5 million in 2012 U.S. dollars.247 McVeigh’s trial took 23
days for the presentation of evidence during the guilt phase.248 The penalty
phase took another 7 days.249 As a result, the entire trial took 30 trial days to
present.
Using this information, we can calculate what the equivalent portion of an
ICTY trial of the same length would cost.250 The investigation and prosecution
portion of a 30-day trial at the ICTY would cost $2.2 million in 2012 U.S.
dollars.251 The legal aid portion of a 30-day trial at the ICTY would cost
$990,000 in 2012 U.S. dollars. Investigation and prosecution costs were more
than fifty times higher for the McVeigh trial than an equivalent ICTY case.
Defense costs were more than twenty times higher. No matter how one slices
it, the cost of the McVeigh trial appears to have outweighed the cost of a
similar trial at the ICTY by more than an order of magnitude.252
The U.S. government was keenly aware of the high cost of the McVeigh
trial. The Department of Justice acknowledged that it was the largest amount it
had ever spent on an investigation and prosecution, but defended the
expenditure on the grounds that bombing was “the largest terrorist act in the
history of the United States” up until then.253 The spokesperson for the
Department of Justice stated that “[w]e believe the cost is justified and that the
taxpayers got their money’s worth.”254
246

Bomb Trials, supra note 244.
Defense costs were assumed to accrue in 1997, the year of the trial. (Author’s Calculation).
248 McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1177.
249 Id. at 1179. The presentation of evidence for the penalty phase began on June 4, 1997, and ended on
June 12, 1997. Id. Assuming that the court did not hear evidence over the weekend, this means that the penalty
phase took seven days.
250 This calculation is based solely on trial days, rather than all of the components of the Complexity
Score, because information is not readily available about the number of witnesses and exhibits presented
during the McVeigh trial. If a complexity calculation is to be based on just one of the components, the number
of trial days is the best component to use. See Heise, supra note 33, at 360.
251 This was calculated as follows: equivalent cost = (number of trial days in McVeigh trial)÷(total
number of trial days in all ICTY trials)×(total cost of ICTY)×(percentage of cost attributable to prosecutions +
percentage of cost attributable to investigations). With the actual figures it becomes:
(30)÷(7691)×(3079726477)×(0.0662+0.1137). Subsequent calculations of the equivalent cost of an ICTY trial
use an analogous methodology.
252 Professor Wippman suggests that the McVeigh trial was unusually short given its complexity due to
tactical decisions made by the prosecution and defense to call a smaller number of witnesses and use fewer
exhibits than either side had initially intended. See Wippman, supra note 14, at 873. Even if the prosecution
and defense had chosen differently and thus doubled the length of the trial, the basic conclusion about the
trial’s efficiency would remain the same.
253 Bomb Trials, supra note 244.
254 Id.
247
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b. Defending Jeffrey Skilling
In May 2006, former Enron CEO Jeffrey K. Skilling was convicted of
conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and
insider trading in connection with the 2001 collapse of Enron Corporation.255
Total defense costs for Mr. Skilling were estimated at more than $65
million.256 This included the costs of his five trial attorneys, a team of
associates and paralegals who helped prepare the defense, jury consultants,
graphics specialists, and expert witnesses.257 Adjusted for inflation, that means
the defense spent $74 million in 2012 U.S. dollars. The trial took 60 trial days
to complete258 and involved “some of the most sophisticated business deals
ever to make their way into a courtroom.”259 In comparison, the defense costs
of a 60-day trial at the ICTY would be approximately $1.98 million in 2012
U.S. dollars. Again, the ICTY costs are much smaller. In this case, they are
more than thirty times smaller.
c. Prosecuting O.J. Simpson
On October 3, 1995, O.J. Simpson was acquitted of the murders of his exwife Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman.260 There is sufficient
information to calculate a Complexity Score for the trial.261 The O.J. Simpson
trial has a Complexity Score of 0.79. This means the Simpson trial was about
as complex as the median ICTY trial. The trial reportedly cost Los Angeles
County about $9 million for the direct trial costs and the prosecution costs.262
This would be the equivalent of $13.6 million in 2012 U.S. dollars. By
comparison, the direct trial costs and prosecution costs of a case with a
Complexity Score of 0.79 would cost $10.6 million in 2012 U.S. dollars at the
ICTY. Once again, it appears the ICTY trial would be cheaper, but the margin
is much smaller.
255

See United States v. Jeffrey K. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2011).
See Carrie Johnson, After the Enron Trial, Defense Firm is Stuck With the Tab WASH. POST, June 16,
2006, at D1.
257 Id. at D3.
258 See Brief for the United States as Appellee at 5, United States v. Jeffrey K. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th
Cir. Nov. 13, 2007) (No. 06-20885), 2007 WL 4207556.
259 See Johnson, supra note 248, at D1.
260 See James Sterngold, Not Guilty: The Man; Simpson Walks Out of the Courtroom a Free Man and Into
the Lucrative Free Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A10.
261 According to USA Today, the trial lasted 141 trial days (including opening and closing statements),
126 witnesses testified, and 857 exhibits were entered into evidence. See The O.J. Simpson trial, by the
numbers, USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 1996), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/index/nns062.htm.
262 See id.
256
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d. Prosecuting Scott Peterson
In 2004, Scott Peterson was tried and eventually sentenced to death for the
murder of his wife, Laci Peterson, and their unborn son; opening statements in
the guilt phase began on June 1, 2004, and the state rested its case on October
5, 2004.263 The defense began its case on October 18, 2004 and finished on
October 26, 2004.264 The penalty phase began on November 30, 2004, and
ended on December 9, 2004.265 The court sat in session four days a week
during that time.266 All told, the Peterson trial took 81 trial days. According to
one study, based on records kept by the State of California, the cost to
prosecute the Peterson case was $1.4 million ($1.7 million in 2012 dollars).267
The equivalent cost to prosecute a case of the same length at the ICTY would
be $2.1 million in 2012 dollars. Here, the ICTY costs are higher than the
domestic costs, but not by a huge margin.
e. Murder Trials in North Carolina
In 1993, a group of researchers attempted to ascertain the cost of capital
and non-capital murder trials in the state of North Carolina.268 They calculated
the average cost of murder cases including the cost of defense, prosecution and
courtroom time.269 Their calculation excludes investigative costs, as well as
judicial costs not directly related to courtroom time (e.g., deliberating,
researching, and writing opinions).270 They estimated trial length and costs of:
(1) 3.8 trial days and $16,697 ($27,323 in 2012 dollars) for non-capital murder
trials; (2) 10.6 days and $57,290 ($93,752 in 2012 dollars) for capital trials that

263 See The State’s Case: Jun 1–Oct 15, 2004, PWC CONSULTING, http://pwc-sii.com/Timeline/State.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter The State’s Case]. Note that this website is not an impartial source; it
is devoted to the idea that Scott Peterson is innocent. Nevertheless, it appears to be reliable for the purpose of
identifying the number of trial days.
264 See The Defendant’s Case, Jury Deliberations, & Verdict: Oct 6–Nov 12, 2004, PWC CONSULTING,
http://pwc-sii.com/Timeline/Defense.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
265 See Penalty Phase, Motions, & Sentencing: Nov 13, 2004–Mar 17, 2005, PWC CONSULTING, http://
pwc-sii.com/Timeline/Penalty.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
266 The State’s Case, supra note 263. They indicate that the court heard testimony Mondays through
Thursdays but was not in session on Fridays. Id. There were also some additional days when the court was not
in session. These days included July 1st, July 5th, July 8th, August 9th, August 19th, and September 6th. Id.
267 See MINSKER, supra note 226, at 21.
268 See COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 167, at 47 (reporting figures for the cost of murder trials in North
Carolina in 1991 and 1992).
269 Id. at 45.
270 Cf. id. In this way, their calculation does not include the total judicial cost of the trial, which the ICTY
figures do, but there is no way to account for this discrepancy.
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ended after the guilt phase; and (3) 14.6 days and $84,099 ($137,623 in 2012
dollars) for a bifurcated capital trial.271
Their calculations are not exactly comparable to the ICTY figures. First of
all, their calculation of judicial costs excludes judicial time outside of the
courtroom. Second, they included time spent on pre-trial motions as trial
time,272 whereas the ICTY figures do not count pre-trial hearings as trial time.
These factors are likely to improve their estimated efficiency as compared to
the ICTY. Nevertheless, comparable ICTY figures for the cost of prosecution,
defense and direct trial costs are: (1) $403,000 for a 3.8 day trial; (2)
$1,113,000 for a 10.6 day trial; and (3) $1,552,000 for a 14.6 day trial. The
ICTY trials are an order of magnitude more expensive than the average murder
trial in North Carolina in the early 1990s. Even given the differences in the
way the numbers are calculated, it seems clear that ICTY trials are
significantly less efficient.
f. Murder Trials in Maryland
A similar study was carried out in 2008 on the cost of death eligible murder
trials in Maryland.273 In that study, the researchers concluded that the cost and
trial length of an average murder trial was: (1) 3.1 days and $158,000
($175,000 in 2012 dollars) for a non-capital murder trial; (2) 10.2 days and
$672,000 ($743,000 in 2012 dollars) for a case where a death notice was filed;
and (3) 13.2 days and $1,038,000 ($1,150,000 in 2012 dollars) for a case that
resulted in a death sentence.274 This calculation includes the cost of
prosecution, defense and direct trial costs.275
Equivalent costs at the ICTY would be: (1) $329,000 for a 3.1 day trial; (2)
$1,047,000 for a 10.2 day trial; and (3) $1,355,000 for a 13.2 day trial. Here,
the ICTY costs are higher than the equivalent costs in Maryland, but not by
nearly as much as in the North Carolina study. Moreover, the difference is
smaller for the cases where the prosecuting attorney gave notice that the death
penalty would be sought (41%) than for cases where it was not sought (88%).
Finally, the difference is smallest (31%) when comparing the ICTY cases to
cases that resulted in a death penalty. To put it another way, the efficiency of
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272
273
274
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Id. at tbls 6.2 & 6.3.
Id. at 96.
See ROMAN, ET AL., supra note 226.
Id. at tbls. 5 & 6.
Id. at app. B (describing how the cost data was calculated).
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the Maryland cases decreased as their complexity increased. This suggests that
cost does not scale linearly with complexity.
g. Murder Trials in Kansas
In 2003 the Kansas state auditors estimated the cost of death penalty trials
in Kansas.276 Their report contains sufficient information to compare costs in
Kansas to the ICTY. They estimated that the average cost and length of murder
trials was: (1) $110,000 ($137,000 in 2012 dollars) and 7.4 trial days for a
murder trial; (2) $291,000 ($363,000 in 2012 dollars) and 19 trial days for a
case where the death penalty was requested but not imposed; and (3) $744,000
($928,000 in 2012 dollars) and 22 trial days for cases in which the death
penalty was imposed.277 These figures include the direct trial costs, the defense
costs, the prosecution costs, and investigation costs.
Equivalent costs for the ICTY would be: (1) $1,233,000 for a 7.4 day trial;
(2) $2.9 million for a trial lasting 19 days; and (3) $3.3 million for a trial
lasting 22 days. The ICTY is an order of magnitude more expensive than
Kansas courts in prosecuting average murder trials. But, like the results for
Maryland, as the cases get more complex, the differential gets smaller. When
considering cases where the death penalty was imposed, the ICTY is only 3.5
times more expensive than the Kansas courts. Again, it seems that cost does
not scale linearly with complexity.
h. Conclusion
One thing that is clear from the domestic data is that even after adjusting
for complexity, there is no such thing as a general efficiency rating for
domestic courts. Rather, there is great variability in the efficiency of courts in
the United States.278 Even if one considers just average murder trials, there are
huge differences in cost and efficiency. North Carolina reported an average
cost of $27,000, while Maryland reported an average cost of $175,000 (both
figures in 2012 dollars). There are at least two factors that could partially
explain the difference in cost: (1) time, and (2) location. In general, the
cheapest figures are for the oldest studies. In this regard, the North Carolina

276 KAN. LEGIS. DIVISION OF POST AUDIT, COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL
AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2003), available at http://www.kslpa.org/docs/reports/04pa03a.
pdf.
277 Data used to calculate these figures was taken from id. at Chart I-2 and Appendix E.
278 See COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 167, at 6; ROMAN ET AL., supra note 226, at tbl.1.
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study (1993) reports the lowest costs, the Kansas study (2003) reports higher
costs, and the Maryland study (2008) reports the highest costs, even after
adjusting for inflation. This may suggest that trial costs have been increasing
faster than inflation. In addition, there are probably differences depending on
where the trial takes place. Part of the reason that trial costs in Maryland are
more expensive than in North Carolina is because the cost of living is higher in
Maryland.279
Complexity does not explain the differences in cost, as the average length
of a murder trial in North Carolina (3.8 days) was very similar to the average
length of a murder trial in Maryland (3.1 days). In the end, neither time,
location or complexity seems capable of explaining the more than sixfold
difference between the cost of a murder trial in North Carolina and Maryland.
This suggests that efficiency is the explanation and that there are real
differences in efficiency across different jurisdictions within the United States,
even for average cases.
If we switch from looking at efficiency across states to looking at intrastate efficiency, the three studies that compare the costs of average murder
trials to death penalty trials in the same location at the same time indicate that
cost does not increase linearly with complexity. This can be seen in Table 6,
where after compensating for trial complexity, death penalty cases are less
efficient in Kansas, North Carolina, and Maryland than ordinary murder trials,
sometimes by a large amount. The efficiency ratings for the high profile
murder trials of O.J. Simpson and Scott Peterson are consistent with this
finding. Both were significantly more complex than the average death penalty
case in North Carolina, Kansas, or Maryland. Once adjusted for their
complexity, the efficiency of these high-profile murder trials was fairly close
to that of the ICTY, and generally less than that of the average death penalty
case. Taken together, this data suggests that it is a general rule that efficiency
will decrease as complexity increases.

279

For example, the cost of supporting a family consisting of two adults and two children in North
Carolina is roughly $39,000 in North Carolina and $47,000 in Maryland. Amy K. Glasmeier, Living Wage
Calculator, M.I.T., http://livingwage.mit.edu/ (last updated Mar. 24, 2014).
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Table 6: Relative Efficiency of Various Courts and Trials
Relative Efficiency
Murder Trial in North Carolina
Guilt Phase Death Penalty Trial in NC
Bifurcated Death Penalty Trial in NC
Murder Trial in Kansas
Death Penalty Sought in Kansas
Death Penalty Imposed in Kansas
Murder Trial in Maryland
Death Penalty Sought in Maryland
Scott Peterson Prosecution
Death Penalty Imposed in Maryland
ICTY
SCSL
O.J. Simpson Trial
Timothy McVeigh Defense
Jeffrey Skilling Defense
Timothy McVeigh Prosecution

14.9
12
11.3
9
7.99
3.56
1.88
1.41
1.24
1.18
1
0.89
0.78
0.05
0.03
0.02

Table 6 shows the relative efficiency of the various courts and trials
discussed above. All results are comparisons to the ICTY’s efficiency, which
was set at 1. Higher numbers mean greater efficiency, lower numbers mean
less efficiency. Table 6 demonstrates the massive differences in efficiency
across trials in the United States. The most efficient trials considered in this
Article, murder trials in North Carolina, are 745 times more efficient than the
Timothy McVeigh prosecution, even once you adjust for their relative
complexity. The ICTY is in the bottom half of the list, but it is not last. Indeed,
it is more efficient than trials at the SCSL, as well as high profile domestic
trials like those of O.J. Simpson, Jeffrey Skilling, and Timothy McVeigh. It is
also worth pointing out again that the efficiency rating for the ICTY
underestimates its true efficiency for a number of reasons, including that it
does not incorporate the complexity of the three remaining cases or the
complexity associated with the guilty pleas obtained at the ICTY.280
The question then becomes not whether the ICTY is more efficient than
domestic criminal trials, but rather which domestic criminal trials should the
ICTY be compared to? If we compare the ICTY’s trials to the average murder
280

See supra Part III.C.
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trial, the ICTY will look grossly inefficient. If we compare it to the average
death penalty trial, the ICTY will be slightly less efficient. If we compare it to
high profile murder trials, the ICTY has roughly the same efficiency. On the
other hand, if we compare the ICTY to extremely complex white collar crime
cases like that of Jeffrey Skilling or to mass atrocity crimes like those of
Timothy McVeigh, the ICTY appears to be a model of efficiency.
The ICTY’s trials should not be compared to average murder trials for a
number of reasons. To begin with, ordinary murder trials usually involve a
single perpetrator,281 a relatively small number of counts, and are concerned
with acts that take place in a relatively small period of time and at a small
number of locations. Accused at the ICTY are much more likely to be tried in
multi-accused trials, they are likely to be charged with many more counts than
domestic accused,282 and the alleged crimes are likely to have taken place at
many more locations and over longer periods of time.283 Moreover, such
crimes are usually undertaken by hierarchical groups working together and
proving them often requires proof of the criminal acts of individuals other than
the accused.284 In short, the trials at the ICTY look very little like the average
murder trial before a domestic court.
In addition, cost seems to increase faster than complexity. One result is that
efficiency decreases as complexity increases. This suggests that comparing the
efficiency of cases that have vastly different complexities is not a fair
comparison. The less complex cases will appear to be more efficient. A fair
comparison requires the cases to be of roughly equivalent complexity. Thus,
the average murder trial is not a fair comparator for the ICTY’s caseload
because they are much less complex than ICTY cases. The average murder
trial took 7.4 days in Kansas, 3.8 days in North Carolina, and 3.1 days in
Maryland.285 Even the average death penalty case is not a fair comparator. The
data from Kansas, North Carolina, and Maryland suggest that the average trial
that resulted in a death penalty took between 13 and 22 trial days to
complete.286 The average ICTY case takes 176 trial days to resolve.

281

See Ford, supra note 71, at 68 n.92.
See supra Part II.A.
283 See supra Part I.D.
284 Id.
285 See COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 167, at 49; ROMAN, ET AL., supra note 226, at 24; KAN. LEGIS.
DIVISION OF POST AUDIT, supra note 276, at 18.
286 See COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 167; ROMAN, ET AL., supra note 233; KAN. LEGIS. DIVISION OF
POST AUDIT, supra note 276.
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Finally, the gravity of the crimes charged in ICTY cases is far greater than
in the average murder trial. The average murder trial in a domestic system
involves a single victim. The typical ICTY case involved allegations of the
unlawful killing of more than 100 people, often combined with other unlawful
acts like the torture, mistreatment, imprisonment, or forcible transfer of large
numbers of people.287 Only the most serious mass atrocity crimes tried in
domestic criminal justice systems approach the complexity and gravity of the
average ICTY trial.288 This suggests that the most appropriate comparison is
between the ICTY’s cases and domestic mass atrocity trials. And by this
comparison, the ICTY appears to be vastly more efficient.
My sample includes cost data on only a single U.S. mass atrocity trial that
is similar in gravity to the average ICTY case—the trial of Timothy McVeigh
for the Oklahoma City bombing—but I suspect that other mass atrocity crimes
investigated and prosecuted in the United States have equally large costs. For
example, there is no data yet on the cost of the investigation of the bombing of
the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, although the government may eventually be
required to disclose that information.289 Nevertheless, the investigation is
described as a decade-long affair that involved personnel from the FBI, Naval
Criminal Intelligence Service, CIA, and prosecutors from New York, the
Justice Department, and the Pentagon.290 There is also little concrete
information on the cost of the government’s response to the bombing of U.S.
embassies in East Africa in 1998, but what little information exists suggests a
similarly massive investigation.291 Finally, although the U.S. response to the
terrorist bombings on September 11, 2001, was not principally legal in nature,
it can certainly be said that the cost of the response was not an overriding
concern.292 This evidence is not definitive, but it suggests that when the
victims of mass atrocities are Americans, we are willing to spend far more than
the ICTY did to investigate and prosecute them.

287

See Ford, supra note 71, at 76, 104.
See COHEN & KYCKELHAHN supra note 134; id. at 91.
289 See Carol Rosenberg, Lawyers Spar Over Funding in Guantanamo Court, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 12,
2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/760/index.html.
290 Id.
291 The initial investigation was described as involving more than 1,000 FBI employees who were sent to
East Africa, including more than 500 FBI agents. See Wippman, supra note 14, at n.80.
292 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE
COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 7–8 (2008) (“The tone of the administration was cavalier, as if the sums involved
were minimal.”).
288
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Nor are we alone in this approach to mass atrocities. While cost data on
trials in other countries’ domestic systems is also difficult to find, some data is
available on the trial of Anders Breivik, who was accused of killing 77 people
and wounding 42 more in Norway in July 2011.293 In addition, some
information is available on the trial of the individuals accused of carrying out
the bombing of trains in Madrid in 2004 that killed 192 and injured an
additional 1,400.294
The investigation of Anders Breivik’s crimes took more than one year and
the crimes were investigated by a specially created police force comprised of
more than 100 investigators with specialties in evidence, victims, witnesses
and international cooperation.295 The investigation was described as “the
biggest in Norway’s history.”296 The trial began on April 16, 2012, and
concluded on June 22, 2012.297 Thus it lasted 50 days. It was described at the
“most serious criminal trial” in Norway’s history by the chief justice of the
court.298 According to one source, the total cost of the legal proceedings
against Breivik at the completion of the trial was 165 million Norwegian
Kroners.299 This is the equivalent of approximately $27 million.300 It appears
that this figure includes the cost of the prosecutors, defense counsel, victim and
witness participation, security, detention, and direct trial costs.301 The cost of
an equivalent trial at the ICTY including these components would be $8.3
million. Thus, the Breivik trial ended up being more than three times as
expensive as an equivalent trial at the ICTY.

293
See Walter Gibbs & Elinor Schang, Norway Police To Track Killer’s Funds in Year-Long Probe,
REUTERS NORWAY (Aug. 3, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/08/03/idINIndia-58607220110803.
294 See Ford, supra note 71, at 79, 100.
295 See Gibbs & Schang, supra note 284.
296 Id.
297 See Timeline: Anders Breivik, ALJAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/08/20128231
4116683446.html (last modified Aug. 24, 2012).
298 See Alastair Reed, Kristin Myers & Josiane Kremer, Breivik Claims Self-Defense as Oslo Terror Trial
Starts, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-16/breivik-defends-massacreas-norway-s-saddest-trial-starts.html.
299 See Breivik’s Attacks Cost Billions, NEWSINENGLISH.NO (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newsinenglish.
no/2012/08/24/breiviks-attacks-cost-billions/.
300 This was calculated using an exchange rate of .1689 Kroner to the Dollar. See Historical Exchange
Rates, http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
301 See Breivik’s Attacks Cost Billions, supra note 299. Various other articles contain some cost data, but
none seem as comprehensive. See Reed, Myers & Kremer, supra note 298 (noting that the court estimated
before the trial began that the cost of court administration during the proceeding would be 76 million kroner).
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The trial of the Madrid train bombers took approximately four months and
was described at the time as “Europe’s biggest terrorism court case.”302 A fourmonth trial equates to about 80 trial days. An 80-day trial at the ICTY would
cost about $2.1 million to prosecute with another $3.7 million in direct trial
costs. No data was available on the cost of the investigation, but the Spanish
Ministry of Justice did release a partial accounting of the costs of the trial.
Unfortunately, the figures do not include some very important costs, like the
salaries of the judges or prosecutors. Nevertheless, the Spanish government
reported that even these partial costs of the trial equated to €3.1 million with
one month left to go in the trial.303 This is the equivalent of $4.7 million in
2012 dollars.304 In short, with one month of the trial still to complete, the
partial cost of the Madrid trial reported by the Spanish government excluding
salaries ($4.7 million) was almost the same as the total cost of a similar trial at
the ICTY including salaries ($5.8 million). Given this, it seems almost certain
that the total cost of the Madrid trial exceeded the cost of an equivalent trial at
the ICTY.
When the ICTY is compared to those domestic trials that most resemble its
caseload—mass atrocity trials—the ICTY looks fairly efficient. In fact, the
constant questions about the cost and efficiency of the ICTY seem to represent
a subtle form of discrimination between “us” and “them.” The data on mass
atrocity crimes in the United States suggests that had the atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia been perpetrated against Americans, we would gladly have
spent much more than $3 billion to investigate and prosecute them. In this
regard, the Department of Justice was adamant that the money spent on the
McVeigh trial was well spent because of the nature and gravity of his crime,
despite the fact that it was approximately fifty times less efficient than trials at
the ICTY.305 The disparate expenditures on atrocity crimes when the victims
are Americans versus non-Americans suggests that we believe the lives of
others are worth less of an investment in justice. This is consistent with
research showing that we generally tend to value foreign lives less than

302 Madrid Train Bombings Trial Wraps Up, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at 8, available at http://articles.
latimes.com/2007/jul/03/world/fg-briefs3.2.
303 See Paloma Díaz Sotero, Desglose Económico del Ministerio: ¿Cuánto Cuesta el Macrojuicio del 11M?, EL MUNDO, http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2007/06/01/espana/1180718228.html (last updated June 2,
2007).
304 The exchange rate for July 2007 was 1.3704 Euros to the Dollar. See Historical Exchange Rates, supra
note 300. Inflation data came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See Consumer Price Index – All Urban
Consumers, available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid07av.pdf.
305 See Bomb Trials, supra note 244.
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domestic lives.306 While this Article focused on a comparison with domestic
criminal trials in the United States, it seems likely that a similar dynamic
would apply in other countries.307
Thus one may reverse the initial question and ask not why we spend so
much on the ICTY, but rather why we spend so little on it compared to what
we would spend if atrocities on a similar scale occurred here. The answer may
be that humans have a tendency to distinguish between “us” and “them” and
treat victims of our own group better than victims of other groups.308 On the
other hand, some argue that we have little or no obligation to those outside of
our own borders.309
CONCLUSION
It is common to claim that the ICTY has cost too much and taken too
long,310 but those who have made this claim have often not made a serious
attempt to understand the complexity of the cases the ICTY tries. As this
Article shows, trials at the ICTY are orders of magnitude more complex than
most domestic criminal trials. Moreover, the gravity of the crimes alleged in
even the average ICTY case would make them among the most serious crimes
ever prosecuted in the United States.311 Finally, whereas almost all criminal
prosecutions in the US are resolved through a plea deal, more than 80% of the
accused at the ICTY receive a full trial. The result is a system of unparalleled
complexity. In fact, the ICTY appears to have prosecuted the most complex set
of related criminal cases ever attempted. Thus, it is hardly surprising that it
takes a long time and costs a lot of money to try these cases.
Moreover, there is little evidence that the ICTY is inefficient. For one
thing, the ICTY has been more efficient than the SCSL, even though the SCSL
was partially designed to be a response to the alleged inefficiencies of the
ICTY. The SCSL was certainly cheaper than the ICTY, but only because the
306

See, e.g., Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. (2014) 499, 539
(describing how U.S. law consistently assigns lower values to foreign lives than domestic lives).
307 See supra notes 295–304 and accompanying text.
308 See Naomi Ellemers & S. Alexander Haslam, Social Identity Theory, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 379, 380 (Paul A.M. Van Lange et al. eds., 2012). See also Rowell & Wexler, supra note
306, at Section II(B)(4).
309 See Rowell & Wexler, supra note 306, at 519 (discussing differing philosophical views of whether
states owe obligations to individuals outside their borders).
310 See supra notes 5–10.
311 See Ford, supra note 71, at 104 (noting that the average ICTY indictment contains allegations roughly
equivalent to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City).

FORD GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/3/2014 8:55 AM

COMPLEXITY AND EFFICIENCY

63

court has tried fewer cases, not because it was more efficient. This has
implications for a long-running debate about whether hybrid tribunals are a
better model than the ad hoc tribunals. One of the principal arguments in favor
of the hybrid tribunals has been that they will be more efficient than the ad
hocs.312 This turns out not be true for the SCSL. The arguments in favor of
hybrid tribunals have never been solely about efficiency. Nevertheless, in light
of my findings, it is harder to argue that the hybrid model is superior to the ad
hoc model.
Comparing the efficiency of the ICTY to domestic criminal trials highlights
the need to identify which kind of domestic trials to compare it to. The ICTY
has been less efficient than the average murder trial, but the average murder
trial is not a good basis for evaluating the efficiency of the ICTY because the
average murder trial looks nothing like the average ICTY prosecution. Even
complex, high-profile murder cases are not comparable to the ICTY’s cases,
although they are closer. The only domestic cases that are comparable are
those involving the prosecution of mass atrocities. Such trials are rare and
published cost data is even rarer, which makes any conclusions somewhat
tentative. Nevertheless, the ICTY appears to be much more efficient than the
prosecution of comparable mass atrocity cases in the United States. It also
appears to be more efficient than mass atrocity trials in Europe. Thus the
conventional wisdom—that the ICTY’s trials have been too slow and cost too
much—turns out not to be true.
We are still left, however, with the fact that states and policymakers view
the ICTY (and international criminal justice more generally) as too
expensive.313 My findings suggest that we are unlikely to significantly reduce
the cost of international criminal trials by improving their efficiency because
there is little evidence that they are inherently inefficient. Our alternatives are
limited.
We could simply decide not to try serious violations of international
criminal law before international courts, which would save several hundred
million dollars a year.314 However, the international community has repeatedly
committed itself to prosecuting these crimes, creating a host of situationspecific tribunals like the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ECCC. Moreover, it has
created a permanent International Criminal Court and declared that “the most
312
313
314

See supra notes 222–224 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 5–13.
See Ford, supra note 3, at fig.2 (charting spending on international criminal tribunals over time).

FORD GALLEYSPROOFS2

64

12/3/2014 8:55 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not
go unpunished and [] their effective prosecution must be ensured.”315 In light
of that commitment, it seems unlikely that we will stop prosecuting violations
of international criminal law anytime soon.
A second alternative might be to further streamline the trials, but it is
doubtful whether this would be successful. Previous attempts to modify the
procedural rules to improve efficiency have raised questions about whether the
court is favoring expediency at the expense of fairness while simultaneously
failing to significantly shorten the trials.316 Additional changes probably would
not save a huge amount of money, but may well jeopardize the fairness of the
proceedings. Judge Wald has argued that the fairness of the ICTY’s trials was
one of its greatest achievements,317 and it seems unwise to sacrifice this to save
a small amount of money. Fairness may also be central to the court’s
legitimacy and its ability to persuade others to comply with its norms.318 If this
is true, then making the process less fair to save a relatively small amount of
money would be counterproductive because it would undermine the long term
goals of international criminal justice.
A third alternative might be to prosecute violations of international criminal
law but have much simpler charges and trials by trying individuals only for one
or two “symbolic” crimes. This would be a radical departure from the practice
of the ICTY (and most other international courts), which has been to use
representative charging. Of course, charging in international criminal courts is
almost always incomplete. It is usually impossible to present evidence about
every single criminal act that the prosecution believes an accused could be
convicted of. Rather, the goal is to charge the accused with a representative
selection of crimes that accurately conveys the scope of the accused’s
criminality.319 My goal as a prosecutor at the ECCC was to craft an indictment
315 See United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
Rome, July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/RomeStatutEng.pdf.
316 See supra Part IV.A.
317 See Wald, supra note 16, at 466.
318 See Tom Tyler, Legitimacy and Compliance: The Virtues of Self-Regulation, in LEGITIMACY AND
COMPLIANCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8, 11 (Adam Crawford & Anthea Hucklesbury eds., 2013); Tom R. Tyler,
Legitimacy and Rule Adherence: A Psychological Perspective on the Antecedents and Consequences of
Legitimacy, in 11 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY 251 (D. Ramona Bobocel et al. eds., 2010).
319 See supra note 202. See also ICTY Rules, supra note 148, at R. 73bis(D) (suggesting that charges are
“reasonably representative” if they take into account “all the relevant circumstances” including the
classification and nature of the charges, the location of the alleged crimes, the scale of the crimes, and the
victims of the crimes); Daryl A. Mundis, Book Review, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 691, 693 (2008) (arguing that
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that was representative of the geographic scope of the crimes, the types of
crimes that were committed, the temporal scope of the crimes, and the types of
victims. This form of charging, called representative charging, is dramatically
different from symbolic charging where only one or two of the most prominent
or easily proved episodes are chosen.
Symbolic charging might make prosecutions cheaper and faster by
dramatically reducing the number of counts and crime sites included in the
indictment, which would presumably reduce trial complexity. But it is likely
that even these streamlined cases would be very complex compared to average
domestic prosecutions. Moreover, symbolic charging might cause more
problems than it solves. Courts that have tried this approach, for example in the
trials of Saddam Hussein and Thomas Lubanga, have been criticized for failing
to accurately capture the accused’s criminality.320 At least in the Lubanga case,
it did not seem to shorten the trial either.321 Moreover, my own research
indicates that establishing the historical record should be one of the principal
goals of international trials.322 This would be much harder to achieve with
symbolic charging.
A fourth alternative might be to charge only a very limited number of the
most senior leaders. This is the strategy taken by the SCSL, ECCC, and ICC. It
is a cheaper approach because it reduces the number of trials that take place,
but there is no reason to believe that it decreases the length or cost of
individual trials; it may even reduce overall efficiency.323 Moreover, a focus on
the most senior leaders may cause problems. There is no obvious correlation
between seniority and number of counts the indictees were charged with or the
length of the sentence they received.324 Indeed, the most serious and shocking
crimes that came before the ICTY were committed largely by mid-level
prosecutors are “duty bound to draft indictments that reflect the scale and scope of [the accused’s]
criminality”).
320 See Robert Cryer, Prosecuting the Leaders: Promises, Politics and Practicalities, 1 GÖTTINGEN J
INT’L L. 45, 72–74 (2009); Suzan M. Pritchett, Entrenched Hegemony, Efficient Procedure or Selective
Justice?: An Inquiry into Charges for Gender-Based Violence at the International Criminal Court, 17
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 288 (2008); Mundis, supra note 319, at 693 (“Can anyone today
claim that the trial of Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi Special Tribunal and his execution solely for the crimes
in Dujail held him accountable for the totality of his criminal record?”).
321 See supra note 158 (noting that the Lubanga case took 204 trial days to hear).
322 See Ford, supra note 2, at Section IV.
323 It seems likely that there are “economies of scale” at international criminal tribunals and that tribunals
that try more cases will be more efficient than tribunals that try fewer cases. This may be one reason the
SCSL’s efficiency was lower than the ICTY’s efficiency.
324 See Ford, supra note 71, at 73–74, 97.
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accused.325 If, as the Preamble to the Rome Statute says, our goal is to
prosecute the most serious crimes, then we have to be able to prosecute more
than just one or two of the most senior leaders.326
Finally, there is no guarantee that a court that tries many fewer cases would
be more effective than the ICTY (as opposed to more efficient).327 The
question of how many trials are necessary for a court to achieve its purposes is
beyond the scope of this Article, although it is certainly an important question.
To answer it, however, you would need data on the effect of individual trials
on the goals of international criminal justice. At the moment there is no way to
measure how individual trials contribute to a court’s purposes. As a result, it is
impossible to know the optimal number of trials necessary to maximize the
court’s contributions to its purposes. A small number of trials could be better
than a large number of trials, but it could be worse. The optimal number might
vary depending on a host of factors specific to the particular situation. We
simply do not know.
In short, the length, complexity, and cost of international criminal trials
may well be largely unavoidable. Indeed, a number of judges who have
worked at the ICTY eventually came to this conclusion.328 As the comparison
of the complexity and efficiency of international and domestic trials shows, the
cost and length of the ICTY’s trials are a function of the extraordinary
seriousness and complexity of the crimes that the court has been tasked with
adjudicating, rather than any inherent inefficiency arising from the
international nature of the court.
While it may seem that this Article’s focus on the ICTY makes it largely
retrospective in nature, adopting a quantitative approach to complexity and
efficiency has prospective value as well. The ICTY will be shutting down
soon, but these issues will not go away. Indeed, they have already become
hotly contested questions at the ICC, where negotiations over the court’s
budget have been marked by disputes about the court’s efficiency.329 Although

325

See id. at 97.
See supra note 315.
327 See Shany, supra note 26, at 230, 237 (contrasting effectiveness, the ability of an organization to
accomplish its purposes, with efficiency, the relationship between an organization’s inputs and outputs).
328 See Kwon, supra note 1, at 362 (concluding that the complexity of cases is driven by factual and legal
complexity, as well as due process concerns); Wald, supra note 16, at 468 (concluding that international trials
are fundamentally different from most trials in the United States and that they will inevitably be more
complex).
329 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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it is too soon to draw any conclusions about the ICC’s efficiency using the
methodology in this Article because the court has only completed one trial, the
ICC’s efficiency can eventually be measured quantitatively. This would have
substantial value as it would provide members of the Assembly of States
Parties with objective information that they could use in deciding how much
funding the ICC needs to carry out its mandate. This would be a decided
improvement over the current debates about the ICC’s efficiency, which seem
driven more by the desires of certain members to minimize their contributions
than by an objective analysis of the court’s efficiency.
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Appendix: Complexity of Completed ICTY Trials
Case Name

Case Number

Complexity Score

Furundžija
Aleksovski
Vasiljević
Halilović

IT-95-17/1
IT-95-14/1
IT-98-32
IT-01-48
IT-96-23 & IT96-23/1
IT-03-66
IT-01-42
IT-97-25
IT-98-32/1
IT-94-1
IT-04-84
IT-95-11
IT-04-83
IT-96-21
IT-98-33
IT-98-30/1
IT-97-24
IT-04-82

0.07
0.32
0.34
0.35
0.35

IT-02-60
IT-95-13/1
IT-98-29/1
IT-03-67
IT-95-16
IT-98-34

0.77
0.77
0.77
0.78
0.81
0.82

IT-03-68
IT-95-9
IT-05-87/1

0.85
1.00
1.11

Kunarac et al.
Limaj et al.
Strugar
Krnojelac
Lukić & Lukić
Tadić
Haradinaj et al.
Martić
Delić
Mucić et al.
Krstić
Kvočka et al.
Stakić
Boškoski
&
Tarčulovski
Blagojević & Jokić
Mrkšić et al.
Milosević, Dragomir
Šešelj
Kupreškić et al.
Naletilić
&
Martinović
Orić
Simić et al.
Đorđević

0.37
0.42
0.46
0.51
0.62
0.62
0.62
0.63
0.69
0.69
0.73
0.75
0.76
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Galić
Perišić
Blaškić
Stanišić
&
Simatović
Hadžihasanović &
Kubura
Tolimir
Krajišnik
Gotovina & Markač
Brđanin
Kordić & Čerkez
Šainović et al.
Stanišić & Župljanin
Popović et al.
Prlić et al.

IT-98-29
IT-04-81
IT-95-14
IT-03-69

1.15
1.15
1.17
1.28

IT-01-47

1.32

IT-05-88/2
IT-00-39
IT-06-90
IT-99-36
IT-95-14/2
IT-05-87
IT-08-91
IT-05-88
IT-04-74

1.47
1.51
1.60
1.63
1.72
1.79
1.84
2.46
2.63
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